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I. INTRODUCTION
The federal government's various Indian policies create a
number of boundaries across which Indian tribes must negotiate to
ensure successful management of their natural resources. For example,
the removal, reservation, and treaty-making period of the late 18th and
early 19th Centuries created territorial boundaries that, for many tribes,
did not align with their traditional homelands.' Thereafter, allotment of
many of the resulting tribal reservations decimated the tribal land base
and left a checkerboard ownership pattern of land within many
reservations.2 More recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court
have limited tribal authority over the non-Indian owned squares on the
checkerboard and correspondingly reduced tribal control over reservation
land use and natural resources.
In addition to these geographic boundaries, Indian tribes must
work across governmental boundaries, particularly those imposed by the
trust relationship between tribes and the federal government.' This
relationship, rooted in the Supreme Court's earliest Indian jurisprudence,
impedes the free alienability of tribal land and resulted in the ownership
of such land by the federal government in trust for Indian tribes.' As
federally-owned and managed lands, Indian lands are subject to federal
oversight, which often requires federal approval of leases and other

1.
See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.03[6][a], 6064 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN'S HANDBOOK].
2.
Id. § 1.04, 71-79.
3.
See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (limiting
tribal authority over non-Indians on non-Indian fee lands subject to two exceptions);
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408 (1989) (limiting tribal authority over land use to lands largely closed to nonIndians).
COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at §15.01-15.03, 994-99 (on
4.
trust status of land); Id. § 5.02-03, 391-405 (on federal authority over tribal trust
land); Id. § 6.02[2][b], 507-11 (on limits of tribal authority over non-Indian owned
land).
5.
See, e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) (restricting
alienability of Indian lands without consent of Federal Government); COHEN'S
HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at § 15.03, 997-99.
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transactions affecting those lands.' This federal role imports to Indian
lands the requirements of other federal laws, such as the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1964 ("NEPA"),' and the additional
burdens of federal administrative and regulatory procedures. Therefore,
tribes must often transcend the federal-tribal boundary when seeking to
successfully manage and develop natural resources on their own tribal
lands.
One of the most recent examples of the challenges presented by
the federal-tribal relationship is an attempt by the Bureau of Land
Management ("BLM" or "Agency") to develop a uniform standard for
the regulation of hydraulic fracturing, or "fracking," across both federal
and Indian lands.! As part of the broader federal regulation of tribal
lands, the BLM has long been responsible for authorizing drilling
operations on Indian lands through the approval of an Application for
Permit to Drill ("APD").9 But, in late 2011, then-Secretary of the Interior
Ken Salazar indicated that new rules were needed to update the Agency's
outdated regulatory scheme and account for new fracking technology,
growing public concern over the practice, and potential safety concerns
related to fracking.o After nearly four and a half years of work, the BLM
published its Final Rule regarding Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and
Indian Lands ("Final Rule") on March 26, 2015."

See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 415(a) (2012).
6.
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h (2012).
7.
The BLM's rules apply to "Indian lands" subject to the provisions
8.
of the Act of 1909, 25 U.S.C. § 396 (2012), the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938
("IMLA"), 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (2012), and the Indian Mineral Development
Act of 1982 ("IMDA"), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2107 (2012), which, subject to certain
limited exceptions, includes lands held in trust by the Federal Government for Indian
tribes or individual Indian allottees.
Secretary of the Interior Jim Watt transferred authority over the
9.
"approval of drilling permits" to the BLM via an Amendment No. I to Secretarial
Order 3087 on February 7, 1983. 48 Fed. Reg. 8,983 (Mar. 2, 1983). The BLM's
current regulations covering onshore oil and gas operations, including the issuance
of APDs, are found at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160 (2015). Those regulations apply to mineral
leasing activities on Indian lands by virtue of the regulations of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs ("BIA"), which incorporate them. 25 C.F.R. §§ 211.4, 225.4 (2015).
10.
Dave Cook, Interior Secretary: 'Fracking' can be Safe and
Responsible, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Oct. 5, 2011), available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/monitorbreakfast/2011/1005/Interiorsecretary-Fracking-can-be-safe-and-responsible-VIDEO.
Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands;
11.
Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 16,128 (Mar. 26, 2015).
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The Final Rule added a number of procedural and substantive
requirements for fracking operations to the BLM's existing regulations
and proposed to apply these standards uniformly to both federal public
and Indian lands. 12 According to the Final Rule, such uniformity was
necessary to ensure Indian lands and communities "all receive the same
level of protection as provided on public lands."' 3 In response to
concerns raised during the rulemaking process that such a uniform rule
ignored tribal sovereignty, tribal self-determination, and the federal
government's trust responsibility to Indian tribes, the BLM expressed its
view that providing Indian lands with the same substantive protections as
federal public lands was consistent with the trust responsibility and that
the rule promoted tribal sovereignty by "facilitating coordination."l 4
Furthermore, the Agency noted that the rule included a provision
allowing a tribe to request a variance, but made clear that any such
variance, if approved in the BLM's discretion, would not "necessarily
adopt tribal regulations as the Federal rule."" According to the BLM,
"[b]y recognizing tribal regulations, [the Final Rule] accords with tribal
self-determination to the extent that could be expected from a rule
governing hydraulic fracturing operations." 6
Given the ongoing debate over fracking and its potential
environmental, health, and safety risks," the BLM's attempt to regulate
fracking on a national basis was sure to draw criticism and face
challenges. In fact, within months of the Final Rule's initial proposed
effective date, United States District Judge Scott W. Skavdahl of the
United States District Court for the District of Wyoming preliminarily
enjoined the Rule from taking effect." Although interests both
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id.
Id.

15.

Id.

Id. at 16,185.
16.
17.
See, e.g., Jennifer A. Diouhy, Clinton Doubles Down Against
Fracking in Debate, Raising Alarms, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Mar. 7, 2016),
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-07/clinton-doublesdown-against-fracking-i n-debate-raising-alarms.
18.
Wyoming v. U.S. Dep't. of the Interior, No. 2:15-cv-043-SWS,
, 2015 WL 5845145 (D. Wyo. Sept. 30, 2015). The BLM
_
Supp.
3d
-F.
intended for its Final Rule to take effect on June 24, 2015; however, in response to a
lawsuit filed by a number of western states and an oil and gas industry association,
and joined by one Indian tribe and a multitude of national environmental groups, the
rule was temporarily enjoined by the United States District Court for the District of
Wyoming pending the lodging of the administrative record and, on September 30th,
2015, that court issued a fifty-four-page order preliminarily enjoining the Final Rule.
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supporting and opposing fracking will continue to litigate the merits of
the Final Rule, this article largely avoids the policy divide over fracking
itself and instead critiques the Final Rule as it relates to tribal interests.1 9
Viewed in this light, the BLM's efforts marked a step back from the
ongoing evolution of federal Indian policy, which since the mid-1970s
has aimed to support greater tribal authority and self-governance,
including in other areas of natural resource management.20 Rather than
address tribal issues in accord with this more modern approach, the BLM
instead chose to apply its statutory responsibilities for protecting public
lands uniformly to both federal and Indian lands.2 1 In doing so, the BLM
avoided meaningful tribal input on the rule, overlooked the specific
congressional intent supporting its statutory authority to apply the Final
Rule to Indian lands, and failed to fulfill the federal trust responsibility to
Indian tribes in a manner that promotes tribal sovereignty. Because of
these failures, this article suggests that the BLM modify the Final Rule to
exempt Indian lands and work with tribes to develop a new approach that
would be more consistent with the BLM's statutory and trust
responsibilities.
This article begins by providing an orientation on the regulatory
issues related to fracking with a particular focus on the unique regulatory
structure of energy development on Indian lands. The second section
provides a detailed overview of the development of the Final Rule and
how the BLM treated tribal input during the Final Rule's promulgation.
Based on the issues raised by tribes throughout the rulemaking process,
the article then analyzes the Final Rule in light of the BLM's
responsibility to consult with Indian tribes, the statutory authority on
which the BLM relied to develop the Final Rule, and the federal trust
responsibility. This analysis demonstrates the shortcomings of the Final
Rule, particularly in light of how the federal government's support for
tribal sovereignty and self-determination has evolved in recent years.

19.
See Michael Burger, The (Re)federalization of FrackingRegulation,
2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1483 (2013) ("[t]he debate over who should regulate
fracking-the federal government or the states-has followed a parallel track to the
broader cultural debates, and the corresponding rhetorical alliances are well
established. Those who envision private profit and the expansion of American power
tend to favor state regulation. Those who fear environmental and public health risks,
along with the perpetuation of the fossil fuel economy, tend to favor federal
regulation." Id. at 1486).
20.
See, e.g., National Indian Forest Resources Management Act, 25
U.S.C. §§ 3101-3120 (2012).
Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands;
21.
Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 16,128.
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Based on these shortcomings, the article concludes that the BLM needs
to reconsider the Final Rule as it applies to Indian lands and illustrates
the need for federal agencies to recognize the boundary between federal
and Indian lands in order to better promote tribal sovereignty and selfdetermination.
II. FRACKING: RISKS AND REGULATIONS
The recent proliferation of fracking as a technique for energy
development has generated media, public, and scholarly attention. 22
Although Indian Country has already been the focus of some of this
attention, 23 the BLM's Final Rule provides a new opportunity to analyze
the balance of fracking's risks, rewards, and regulation, particularly
within the unique context of the federal-tribal relationship. This section
provides some background on fracking, the federalism issues inherent in
its regulation, and the current state of energy development oversight in
Indian Country.
A.

What isfracking?

Hydraulic fracturing is the subterranean injection of fluids,
including water, chemicals, and other materials, such as sand or silica, at
high pressure to break up or increase the size and frequency of fractures
in shale or other formations in an effort to release natural gas or oil from

22.

See, e.g., recent motion pictures GASLAND (Trish Adlesic, Molly
GASLAND PART II (Trish Adlesic, Josh
Fox, & Deborah Wallace 2013); Clifford Krauss, Split Decision by Voters on Local
Fracking Bans, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2014/11/06/business/energy-environment/split-decision-by-voters-on-local-fracking
-bans-.html?_r-0; Thomas W. Merrill & David M. Schizer, The Shale Oil and Gas
Revolution, Hydraulic Fracturing, and Water Contamination: A Regulatory
Strategy, 98 MINN. L. REv. 145 (2013).
23.
See, e.g., Raymond Cross, Development's Victim or its
Beneficiary?: The Impact of Oil and Gas Development on the Fort Berthold Indian
Reservation, 87 N.D. L. REV. 535 (2011); Mitchell Davis, Note, FracturedFocus:
Tribal Energy Development and the Regulatory Contest Over Hydraulic Fracturing
In Indian Country, 4 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE & ENV'T. 305 (2013);
Szonja Ludvig, Comment, The Tribes Must Regulate: Jurisdictional,Environmental,
and Religious Considerations of Hydraulic Fracturing on Tribal Lands, 2013
B.Y.U. L. REV. 727 (2013); Kerstie B. Moran, The Bureau of Land Management's
Finalized Hydraulic Fracturing Rule on Tribal Lands: a Responsibility or
Intrusion?, 39 AM. IND. L. REV. 585 (2016).

Gandour, Josh Fox, & David Roma, 2010);
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those formations. 24 Although fracking has been used since the 1940s,
more recent advances in technology and economic conditions,
particularly over the last fifteen years, have significantly expanded its
use and techniques.2 5 In fact, according to a 2013 report from the United
States Department of Energy, the development of so-called
unconventional natural gas, released from shale, "very low permeability
sandstones," or coal seams by fracturing those formations, is more
prevalent than conventional gas development. 26 While federal lands have
seen similar development, the number of permits issued for proposed
wells on those lands declined since a high of over 7,000 in fiscal year
2007.27 Nonetheless, the BLM estimates that ninety percent of the
approximately 2,800 new oil and gas wells started on federal and Indian
lands in 2013 were fracked.28
B. Risks ofFracking
The rapid expansion of fracking across many basins nationwide
has prompted significant discussion and concern over the potential
environmental impacts of the practice. 29 Although the precise extent of

24.
U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
REQUESTORS: OIL AND GAS: INFORMATION ON SHALE RESOURCES, DEVELOPMENT,
AND ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH RISKS, GAO-12-732 9-13 (Sept. 2012),
availableat http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/
647791 .pdf [hereinafter GAO- 12-732].
25.
Id. at 7, fig. 1; John M. Golden & Hannah J. Wiseman, The
Fracking Revolution: Shale Gas as a Case Study in Innovation Policy, 64 EMORY L.
J. 955, 968 (2015); Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic
Fracturing in Oil and Gas Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 117-27 (2009).
26.
NAT'L ENERGY TECH. LAB., MODERN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES: AN UPDATE 11 (Sept. 2013), available at https://www
.netl.doe.gov/File%20Library/Research/OiI-Gas/shale-gas-primer-update-201 3.pdf
(unconventional gas accounted for sixty-five percent of U.S. natural gas production
in 2013 and is expected to account for seventy-nine percent of production in 2040).
27.
BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., NUMBER OF DRILLING PERMITS
APPROVED BY FISCAL YEAR ON FEDERAL LANDS (Oct. 29, 2014), available at

http://www.blm.gov/style/medialib/blm/wo/MIN ERALSREALTYANDRESO
URCEPROTECTION_/energy/oil...gas statistics/datasets.Par.65795.File.dat/nu
mberofapdsapproved.pdf.
28.
80 Fed. Reg. at 16,131.
29.
See generally, Wiseman, supra note 25, at 127-42; David B.
Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy
Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 440-47 (2013); Michael Burger, Response,
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these impacts is not clear,30 spills of both fracking fluids and produced
water, as well as emissions from poorly constructed wells, have caused
environmental damage. 3' Thus, the BLM's development of the Final
Rule primarily focused on the potential for contamination of
groundwater supplies, the storage and management of water both used by
and flowing back as a result of fracking operations, and the use and
disclosure of chemicals in the fracking process. 32
The potential for contamination through the underground
migration of fracking fluids depends in large part upon the integrity of
the well and the geology of the area, including the proximity of
underground aquifers to formations targeted for development. 3 3 The
extent of risk posed by each of these conditions is uncertain for a number
of reasons, although significant attention is being focused on resolving
that uncertainty.3 4 For example, in 2011, the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") developed a plan for studying the risks posed by
fracking to groundwater, and in June 2015, released a draft of its
Fracking and Federalism Choice, 161 U. PA. L. REv. Online 150 (2013) (responding
to David Spence's article).
Spence, supra note 29, at 447 ("significant uncertainty remains
30.
regarding the magnitude and frequency of the negative effects of fracking. This
uncertainty is reflected in the contrasting and evolving approaches taken by states in
fracking regulations."); GAO-12-732, supra note 24, at 4 ("[t]he risks identified in
the studies and publications we reviewed cannot, at present, be quantified, and the
magnitude of potential adverse effects or likelihood of occurrence cannot be
determined for several reasons.")
See, e.g., Fracking on Federal Lands: Hearing on the Future of
31.
Hydraulic Fracturingon Federally Managed Lands: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Energy and Mineral Res. of the H. Comm. on Natural Res., 114th Cong.
(July 15, 2015) (statement of Hannah J. Wiseman at 5-6), available at
http://naturalresources.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
wisemantestimony.pdf (describing incidents and collecting sources).
32.
See, e.g., Oil and Gas; Well Stimulation, Including Hydraulic
Fracturing, on Federal and Indian Lands, 77 Fed. Reg. 27,691 (May II, 2012)
("[t]he extension of the practice has caused public concern about whether fracturing
can allow or cause the contamination of underground water sources, whether the
chemicals used in fracturing should be disclosed to the public, and whether there is
adequate management of well integrity and the 'flowback' fluids that return to the
surface during and after fracturing operations.").
33.
GAO-12-732, supra note 24, at 46-49 (collecting studies and
including a table showing the relative depth of fracking operations and groundwater
supplies in the nation's primary areas of development).
34.
See, e.g., Id. at 4, 49-50 (noting the lack of baseline data for
comparison purposes, variations among business practices and regulatory schemes,
and unique characteristics of each geologic region as factors contributing to
uncertainty regarding these risks).
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Assessment of the Potential Impacts of Hydraulic Fracturing of Oil and
Gas on Drinking Water Resources for review by the EPA Science
Advisory Board ("SAB"). 5 The release of the draft Assessment for
review by the SAB is the penultimate step before a final report of results,
although it remains unclear when such a final report will be issued.3 6
While the EPA report will be helpful in determining the level of
risk, water supplies may still be contaminated through spills or leaks of
water produced by or flowing back from fracking operations.
Mitigation of these risks depends upon the standards for management,
storage, and reuse of produced and flowback water, which can be stored
on-site in lined pits or tanks, reused in future operations, injected back
into the sub-surface environment, or trucked away for treatment and
disposal.38
Concerns over water contamination are related to uncertainty
surrounding the nature, extent, and toxicity of the chemicals used in the
fracking process.3 Operators use a variety of components, along with
copious amounts of water and proppants like sand and silica, in their
fracking fluid and, depending upon the rules applicable to those
operators, may not be required to disclose the contents of those
components even if they are toxic or dangerous. 4 0 In response to calls for

35.
Notification of Teleconferences and a Public Meeting of the Science
Advisory Board Hydraulic Fracturing Research Advisory Panel, 80 Fed. Reg. 32,1 11
(June 5, 2015) (announcing release of the draft assessment to the EPA Science
Advisory Board for review and input).
36.
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, STUDY OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES: PROGRESS REPORT:
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
4,
(Dec.
2012),
available
at

http://www.epa.gov/sitcs/production/files/documents/hf-progress-report-execsummary20l21214.pdf.
37.
GAO-12-732, supra note 24, at 40-44.
38.
Id. at 13; U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES: ENERGY-WATER NEXUS: INFORMATION ON THE QUANTITY,
QUALITY, AND MANAGEMENT OF WATER PRODUCED DURING OIL AND GAS
PRODUCTION, GAO-12-156 14-15 (Jan. 2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/

assets/590/587522.pdf [hereinafter GAO-12-156].
39.
See, e.g., Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian
Lands; Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 16,128 ("Rapid expansion of [fracking] and its
complexity have caused public concern about whether fracturing can lead to or cause
the contamination of underground water sources [and] whether the chemicals used in
fracturing pose risks to human health.")
40.
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ANALYSIS OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING
FLUID

DATA

FROM

THE

FRACFOCUS

CHEMICAL

DISCLOSURE

REGISTRY

1.0,
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full disclosure of the chemicals used in fracking, some companies
involved in fracking operations alleged that such disclosure would
require them to release proprietary information and trade secrets. 4 in
addition to the chemicals used in fracking fluid, the water flowing back
to the surface from fracking operations, called produced or flowback
water, often contains naturally occurring contaminants that may also
pose a threat to workers, public health, and the environment.4 2
Although the BLM focused its rulemaking effort on these
concerns over water contamination, either through spills and leaks or
underground migration resulting from poorly constructed wellbores, and
disclosure of the chemicals used in fracking, the practice may also pose
risks to air quality, wildlife habitat, and the quantity of water supplies.43
These potential risks and the ongoing expansion of fracking has
prompted debate over how fracking should be regulated, particularly
whether states or the federal government should be the primary regulator
and how the appropriate government should develop its regulatory
scheme."
C. State versus FederalRegulation
Although fracking presents a multitude of environmental risks,
no single federal environmental law comprehensively addresses fracking
or provides specific regulatory authority for fracking operations. Thus,
Congress has not yet developed or expressly balanced federal fracking
standards with state and tribal authority as in other environmental laws,
such as the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), Clean Air Act ("CAA"), and the
Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA"). These laws establish national
EPA/601/R-14/003

17,

32

(Mar.

2015),

available

at

http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-03/documents/fracfocusanalysis report andappendices-final_032015 508_0.pdf (identifying 692 unique
ingredients of fracking fluids based on disclosures from fracking operators to
FracFocus database but noting that, for at least seventy percent of those disclosures,
operators claimed the identity of at least one ingredient was confidential business
information); GAO-12-732, supra note 24, at 12, fig. 3.
41.
John Craven, Note, Fracking Secrets: The Limitations of Trade
Secret Protectionin Hydraulic Fracturing, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 395, 401-02
(2014).
42.
GAO-12-156, supra note 38, at 12.
GAO-12-732, supra note 24, at 39-52.
43.
44.
See, e.g., Should the Federal Government Regulate Fracking?,
available
at
(Apr.
14,
2013),
WALL
STREET
JOURNAL
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323495104578314302738867078
(including perspectives on each side of the debate).
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policy and set minimum standards for air or water quality and allow
states and tribes to apply to assume primary regulatory authority for
establishing their own environmental standards, licensing, and
enforcement arrangements.45
While some fracking operations may be subject to air and water
quality regulation under these federal laws, there is no oil and gas
production or fracking-specific federal law or regulation.46 Until 2005,
the SDWA arguably applied to fracking operations as it sought to ensure
protection of drinking water from underground injections. 47 In
interpreting the SDWA, however, the EPA did not require that state
programs authorized under the SDWA include regulation of fracking
because the EPA did not believe that fracking wells were covered by the
statute.4
This regulatory exemption was subsequently codified in the
2005 Energy Policy Act, which specifically excluded "the underground
injection of fluids or propping agents (other than diesel fuels) pursuant to
hydraulic fracturing operations related to oil, gas, or geothermal
production activities" from the definition of "underground injection" for
purposes of the SDWA's application. 49 As a result of the exemption,
federal law does not require that the EPA, or a state or tribe exercising
authority delegated from the EPA, issue a permit to authorize a fracking
operation. 'o

45.
Act, 33 U.S.C.
46.
14.
47.
48.

See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d) (2012); Clean Water
§ 1377 (2012); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-1 1 (2012).
Spence, supra note 29, at 447; GAO-12-732, supra note 24, at 1342 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1) (2012).
Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,

118 F.3d 1467, 1471 (11th Cir. 1997).
49.
42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii).
50.
The application of other federal statutes of general applicability
more specifically focused on environmental protection largely depend upon the
specifics of a particular fracking operation. For example, depending upon how an
operator wishes to dispose of wastewater, the disposal may be subject to the Clean
Water Act (33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1274 (2012) (requiring a permit for discharge)) or the
Safe Drinking Water Act (42 U.S.C. §300f (2012) (for reinjection)); see also U.S.
GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTORS:
UNCONVENTIONAL OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT: KEY ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC
HEALTH REQUIREMENTS, GAO-12-874 (Sept. 2012) [hereinafter GAO-12-874]

(outlining requirements from eight federal environmental and public health laws
applicable to fracking). Oil and gas operations enjoy exemptions from other federal
environmental statutes, however. The disposal of oil and gas wastewater is not
subject to the hazardous waste disposal requirements of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(2)(A) (2012).
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Currently, BLM must approve an APD before an operator can
drill a well on federal or Indian lands."' Although the information to be
submitted with an APD primarily addresses potential surface impacts,52
operators must also submit a drilling plan with technical information
about the integrity of the proposed well.53 Aside from the well
information submitted through the APD process, however, no
overarching federal law specifically governs fracking operations, leaving
comprehensive permitting and regulation of fracking largely a matter of
state control.54 A great deal of debate has ensued as to whether state
primacy or comprehensive federal permitting and regulation of fracking
is the better regulatory approach. 5
A number of states have adopted comprehensive fracking
regulatory regimes that vary both in types of regulation and activities
regulated. 56 In light of the exemption of fracking from the SDWA, and
because no federal law specifically preempts application of state fracking
regulations on federal lands,57 these states generally regulate oil and gas
production on federal lands in conjunction with federal leasing statutes,
such as the Mineral Leasing Act," and accompanying regulations, such
as the BLM's APD standards." The BLM's Final Rule proposed to
51.
43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-1(c) (2012).
52.
Id. § 3162.3-l(d)(2), (f).
53.
Id. § 3162.3-1(d)(1), (e).
54.
Spence, supra note 29, at 447 ("[t]here is no comprehensive federal
licensing regime for onshore oil and gas development. To the contrary, the
regulation of oil and natural gas exploration and production in the United States has
always been primarily a state matter.")
55.
See, e.g., Id. (arguing against broad federal regulation and that
ongoing "regulatory adjustment by states" and federal regulation under existing
authority is an "appropriate response"); Wiseman, supra note 25 (suggesting that
Congress consider reversing the 2005 exemption); Amanda C. Leiter, Fracking,
Federalism, and Private Governance, 39 HARVARD ENvTL. L. REV. 107 (2015)
(analyzing "governance gap" in fracking regulation and discussing whether gap can
be filled by private interest group governance).
56.
GAO-12-874, supra note 50, at 48-50, table 4 (comparing
requirements of six states); Wiseman, supra note 25, at 157-68; NATHAN
RICHARDSON, MADELINE GOTTLIEB, ALAN KRUPNICK & HANNAH WISEMAN, THE
STATE OF STATE SHALE GAS REGULATION (June 2013),
available at

http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/Worklmages/Download/RFF-RptStateofStateRegsReport.pdf.
57.
Cf Cal. Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 58081 (1987) (relying on Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543 (1976)).
58.
30 U.S.C. §§ 181-187b, 189-193, 195, 201-203, 205 to 208-1, 208,
211-214, 223-226, 226-2, 226-3, 228-229a, 241, 251, 261-263 (2012).
59.
43 C.F.R. pt. 3160 (2015).
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incorporate additional federal standards for fracking into these
regulations, some of which would conflict with and thereby preempt
existing state standards. 60
The conflict between the Final Rule and state authority is similar
to the conflicts between states and local governments over localized bans
on fracking. In 2014, the New York State Court of Appeals, New York's
highest court, upheld a municipal ban on fracking in light of the
municipality's authority to control land use planning and zoning. 6' in
doing so, the court noted that the matter was not dependent upon the
policy issues related to fracking, but instead depended upon the
"relationship between the State and its local government subdivisions."62
Similarly, the City of Longmont, Colorado, amended its charter to enact
a similar ban in light of the risks fracking posed to "public health and
safety, property[,] . . . air quality, . . . landscape[, and] drinking and

surface water."6 1 Colorado's Oil and Gas Association and Oil and Gas
Conservation Commission challenged Longmont's ban, arguing that the
City's authority was preempted by state law, which authorized the
Conservation Commission to "regulate oil and gas activity in the state." 64
Because Longmont's ban could not be "harmonized" with the state's
more production-oriented goals, the trial court granted summary
judgment to the state plaintiffs but stayed an injunction against the ban to
allow for appeal.6 5 Similar conflicts between state and local governments
and their respective authorities and interests have proceeded elsewhere. 66
Although the potential for federal-state regulatory conflicts and
disputes over fracking depend upon the approach of each
intrastate
these
state and municipality, they highlight the distinction between the
60.

80 Fed. Reg. at 16,128 (noting age of existing regulations); Id. at

16,130 (listing states with existing hydraulic fracturing regulations in place).
Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E. 3d 1188 (N.Y. 2014).
61.
Id. at 1202.
62.
CITY OF LONGMONT, COLO., CODE OF ORDINANCES, pt. 1, art. XVI,
63.
§ 16.2 (through Jan. 12, 2016), https://www.municode.com/library/co/
longmont/codes/code ofordinances?nodeld=PTICHARTXVILOPUHESAWEAC.
Colo. Oil and Gas Ass'n v. City of Longmont, No. 13CV63, 2014
64.
WL 3690665, at *7-8 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 24, 2014) (order granting mots. for summ.

j.).

Id. at *14. Just as this article was going to publication, the Colorado
65.
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling, holding that the local
government's fracking ban "materially impedes the application of state law" and is
therefore preempted. City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil and Gas Ass'n, No. 15SC667,
P.3d _, 2016 WL 1757509, at *10 (Colo. May 2, 2016).
66.
See Uma Outka, Intrastate Preemption in the Shifting Energy
Sector, 86 U. COLO. L. REv. 927, 954-76 (2015).
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interests of local residents and the broader policies of a larger
government. This distinction is particularly relevant in the tribal context,
where tribal governments face "quantitatively and qualitatively different
risks and impacts from oil and gas development," including risks to tribal
homelands and culturally significant sites, as well as an entirely different
demand for sustained economic development, as compared to their
municipal, state, and federal counterparts."7 The oversight of fracking
thus poses different challenges for Indian tribes. Unlike lands regulated
by states, municipalities, and the public lands managed by the federal
government, tribal land offers connections to innumerable prior
generations and cultural values that have existed since time immemorial.
Many tribes must balance these connections with the potential for
developing their natural resources into significant and much-needed
economic benefits. Beyond distinctions between the nature of tribal lands
and those maintained for state, local, federal, or public purposes, the trust
relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes,
particularly as it relates to the federal government's regulation of tribal
resources, also sets Indian lands apart.
III. ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY
The regulatory environment for energy leasing and development
in Indian Country is the product of the unique relationship between the
federal government and tribal nations and, therefore, poses different
issues than intrastate conflicts or the divide between support for either
state or federal regulation of fracking. Instead, the federal-tribal
relationship is based on the federal government's trust responsibility
toward tribes and their lands and the Indian-specific statutory and
regulatory schemes developed as a result of that relationship.
A. Trust Relationship
The federal government's trust responsibility to Indian tribes is
rooted in federal treaties, laws and policies, and decisions of the Supreme
Court that date to the earliest days of the republic. The widely accepted
genesis of the notion of a trust relationship is Supreme Court Chief
Justice John Marshall's description of the relationship between tribes and
the young federal government as that of a "ward to his guardian." 68 Chief
Justice Marshall based his conception of the trust relationship on the
67.
68.

Cross, supra note 23, at 538.
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
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history of the relationship between native peoples and the colonizing
forces of Europe and, later, the United States federal government, and
relied in large part upon the interpretation of the treaties entered into on a
69
government-to-government basis between those nations. In its earliest
conceptions, the federal government's trust responsibilities manifested in
restraints on the alienation of tribal property without oversight and
approval by the federal government, and the federal protection of
inherent tribal authority within tribal lands through the exclusion of state
authority by the federal-tribal relationship.7 0 The trust responsibility is
foundational in federal Indian law and policy, particularly regarding
federal management of Indian lands.' As a product of that responsibility,
the statutes governing the leasing and development of mineral resources
on tribal lands mandate significant federal oversight of those processes
and generally require federal approval of any mineral lease or
agreement.72 In order to implement this statutory oversight, the Secretary
of the Interior ("Secretary") was granted broad authority for
promulgating regulations, which have come to largely define the nature
of energy development on Indian lands. 3

69.
Id. (reviewing Treaty of Hopewell, 7 Stat. 18, Nov. 28, 1785,
available at http://www.cherokee.org/AboutTheNation/History/Facts/Treatyof Hope
well,1785.asp); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832) (examining history of
British claims to America and treaties with the Cherokee Nation entered into by both
Great Britain and the United States to exclude application of Georgia's laws within
the Cherokee's territory).
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543; Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561 ("The Cherokee
70.
nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory, with boundaries
accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the
citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees
themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress. The whole
intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by our constitution and
laws, vested in the government of the United States.")
COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at § 5.04[3], 412-16.
71.
See, e.g., the Indian Mineral Leasing Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g
72.
(2012) (requiring Secretarial approval of mineral leases on Indian lands).
73.
While the following provides a brief summary, Professor Judith
Royster provides much more detail in her comprehensive overview of the evolution
of the federal-tribal relationship with regard to mineral development. Judith Royster,
Mineral Development in Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal Control over
MineralResources, 29 TULSA L. J. 541 (1994).
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B. Federal Oversight ofEnergy Development
The first comprehensive federal statute governing mineral
development in Indian Country was the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act
("IMLA"). 74 The IMLA authorized the leasing of unallotted lands within
a reservation or lands owned by a tribe under federal jurisdiction, subject
to the approval of the Secretary. 75 The IMLA also set forth general
procedures for the public auction of such leases,76 required lessees to
furnish performance bonds,n and authorized the Secretary to promulgate
rules and regulations to cover "all operations" under any lease approved
pursuant to the IMLA.7 ' The IMLA was intended to provide a measure of
uniformity to what had previously been a mix of leasing laws applicable
to Indian Country while also promoting tribal governmental authority by
requiring tribal consent for each lease authorized under the IMLA,79 and
ensuring that the Secretary maximize returns to tribes from development
of their resources.8 0
Nearly fifty years later, largely in response to concerns from
tribes over the inflexibility of the IMLA's leasing regime, Congress
enacted the Indian Mineral Development Act ("IMDA")." Unlike the
IMLA, which offered no option beyond the lease of tribal minerals, the
IMDA allowed tribes to negotiate and enter a variety of arrangements for
mineral development, including a "joint venture, operating, production
sharing, service, managerial, lease[,] or other agreement." 82 The IMDA
still mandated approval by the Secretary and required the Secretary to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement the IMDA within 180
days of the law's enactment.8 To ensure tribes had a role in the
development of the regulations, Congress required the Secretary to
74.

25 U.S.C.
25 U.S.C.

§§ 396a-396g.

§ 396a. Originally, the IMLA's leasing provisions did
not apply to "the Crow Reservation in Montana, the ceded lands of the Shoshone
Reservation in Wyoming, the Osage Reservation in Oklahoma, [or] to the coal and
asphalt lands of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Tribes in Oklahoma." 25 U.S.C. § 396f.
Congress subsequently removed the exception for the Crow Reservation. Crow Tribe
of Indians v. Montana, 650 F. 2d 1104, 1111, n.6 (9th Cir. 1981).
76.
25 U.S.C. § 396b.
77.
25 U.S.C. § 396c.
78.
25 U.S.C. § 396d.
79.
25 U.S.C. § 396a.
80.
See Crow Tribe, 650 F. 2d at 1112-13 (describing Congressional
intent of the IMLA).
81.
25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2108 (2012).
82.
25 U.S.C. § 2102(a).
83.
25 U.S.C. § 2107.
75.
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"consult with national and regional Indian organizations and tribes with
expertise in mineral development both in the initial formulation of [the
regulations] and [in] any future revision or amendment.""
In an effort to fulfill Congress' directive to ensure tribal input,
the Secretary circulated a draft set of regulations to tribes, national tribal
organizations, and tribal attorneys for comment, and incorporated "many
of the[ir] suggestions" before even opening the public comment period
on the proposed regulations." Comments from tribes and tribal
organizations were also submitted and considered during the public
comment period." Then, although the regulations had been published as
a final version, the Secretary, citing "uncertainty expressed by Indian
interests and industry on numerous issues," determined that the
regulations needed to be entirely "reformatted and revised" to separate
the regulations relevant to IMLA from those implementing IMDA." In
doing so, the drafters sought "to ensure that Indian mineral owners and
Indian mineral lessees ha[d] a full opportunity to review and comment."
So, the regulations were published as draft, not final, and meetings were
scheduled to discuss the draft." Additional comment was also sought on
the separate IMLA regulations "in order to address comments expressed
by tribal representatives" and others." Ultimately, the final IMDA
regulations were adopted in 1994.90 In 1996, the Department of the
Interior ("DOI" or the "Department") adopted new IMLA regulations. 9 1
Thus, in accordance with the IMDA's requirement that the Secretary
seek and obtain tribal input in promulgating regulations, the Secretary
relied upon consultation with and input from tribes throughout the
development of regulations for both IMLA and IMDA. In fact, it was

84.

Id.

85.

Mining Regulations, Proposed Rule, 48 Fed. Reg. 31,978 (July 12,

1983).
Contracts for Prospecting and Mining on Indian Lands; Oil and Gas
86.
and Geothermal Contracts, Final Rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 31,916 (Aug. 24, 1987).
87.
Leasing of Tribal Lands for Mineral Development, Leasing of
Allotted Lands for Mineral Development, and Oil and Gas, Geothermal and Solid
Mineral Agreements, Proposed Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,734 (Nov. 21, 1991).
88.
Id. at 58,735.
89.
Leasing of Tribal Lands for Mineral Development; Leasing of
Allotted Lands for Mineral Development, 57 Fed. Reg. 40,298 (Sept. 2, 1992).
90.
Oil and Gas, Solid Mineral, and Geothermal Minerals Agreements,

59 Fed. Reg. 14,960 (Mar. 30, 1994).
91.
Leasing of Tribal Lands for Mineral Development and Leasing of
Allotted Lands for Mineral Development, Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 35,634 (July 8,
1996).
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largely tribal input that resulted in the separation of the IMLA from the
IMDA regulations, which clarified each as a distinct regulatory scheme.92
Both the IMLA and the IMDA regulations incorporated the
BLM's regulations governing onshore oil and gas development and
applied them to IMLA and IMDA leases.9 3 One justification for doing so,
as set forth in the publication of the final IMLA regulations, was that
"[a]ppropriate consistency [between the mineral leasing and
development of Indian and federal lands] is desirable because many of
the operating and reclamation regulations of other offices and bureaus of
the Department [ ] are also applicable in the day-to-day management of'
Indian lands.94 That justification failed to note, however, that the
regulations of other DOI agencies and bureaus, like the BLM, were
applied to Indian lands solely through adoption of the Department's own
regulations. Even then, the publication of the final IMLA regulations
went on to recognize that "in a number of important respects mineral
leasing and development on Indian lands differ from such activities on
Federal lands." 95

92.
Id. at 35,635 (restating that the expression of uncertainty by Indian
interests and industry supported the reformatting and revision); see 25 C.F.R. pt. 211
(2016) (for IMLA); 25 C.F.R. pt. 225 (2016) (for IMDA). In 1982, the BLM
assumed responsibility for certain oversight and approval functions on federal lands
from the United States Geological Survey and the Mineral Management Service
("MMS"). 48 Fed. Reg. 8,983 (Mar. 2, 1983). At the time, Secretary Jim Watt also
transferred the MMS's responsibilities over such functions on Indian lands to the
BIA. Id. ("Those functions now performed by the MMS which are being transferred
to the BLM will, in the case of their application to Indian lands, be similarly
transferred from the MMS to the Bureau of Indian Affairs." Id.). Just over a month
later, Secretary Watt amended that Order to consolidate the BLM's authority over
both federal and Indian lands. Id.; see also DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, DEPARTMENT
MANUAL
235
DM
1,
1.1.K
(Oct.
5,
2009),
available at
http://elips.doi.gov/elips/0/fol/884/Rowl.aspx ("[tlhe [BLM] Director . . . may
exercise the authority of the Assistant Secretary - Land and Minerals Management
for administering operations on oil and gas, geothermal, and other mineral leases on
Federal and Indian lands under . . . the [IMLA] (25 U.S.C. 396a) . . . and other
authorities under which the [BLM] issues mineral leases.")
25 C.F.R. §§ 211.4, 225.4.
93.
94.
61 Fed. Reg. at 35,638.
95.
Id. at 35,638-39. In fact, Interior's efforts to revise the IMLA
regulations arose from a recognition by then-Secretary Rogers C.B. Morton that a
revision was needed in order to "better fulfill [his] future trust responsibility to
assure the protection of Indian culture and environmental interests as well as to
allow maximum development of Indian natural resources." TEXT OF DECISION ON
NORTHERN CHEYENNE PETITION

3, in OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y,

DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
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Federal oversight and approval of IMLA and IMDA agreements
implicates other federal standards beyond the regulations of other
Interior offices and bureaus as well. For example, before taking action to
approve a lease or agreement on Indian lands, NEPA requires the
Secretary to analyze the potential environmental impacts of such
actions. 96 The Secretary must also ensure compliance with various
federal cultural protection laws. 9 7
The equal application of federal law and regulations to both
federal and Indian lands and the involvement of various federal bureaus
and agencies in the management of Indian lands has resulted in what a
recent Government Accountability Office ("GAO") report described as a
"framework [that] can involve significantly more steps than the
development of private and state resources, increase development costs,
and add to the timeline for development." 98 That report also noted the
sentiment among many stakeholders that development in Indian Country
"is generally not managed according to tribal priorities and does not
reflect that Indian lands are intended for the use and benefit of Indian
tribes and their members," but are instead "being managed according to
priorities generally associated with public lands." 99
Therefore, although it was considered "appropriate" to apply the
BLM's operating regulations equally to both federal and Indian lands
when the final IMLA and IMDA regulations were developed in the mid1990s, the result is a regulatory environment that manages Indian lands
according to public, not tribal, priorities. In addition, the federal

NEWS RELEASE: MORTON ANNOUNCES DECISION OF NORTHERN CHEYENNE COAL
LANDS (June 4, 1974), available at http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/

text/idc-022233.pdf. In publishing the first draft of those revised regulations, the
Department noted that it had delayed a concurrent effort to develop regulations
regarding coal mining to exclude Indian-owned coal from rules applicable to federal
lands. Mining on Indian Lands: Mineral Development Contracts, Proposed Rules, 42
Fed. Reg. 18,083 (Mar. 30, 1977). Then-Secretary Kleppe's reasoning for doing so
was "based upon the conclusion that considerations governing the administration of
Indian-owned resources are different from those involved in administering the public
estate" and that the regulations as they applied to federal lands "could not be married
to the Department's legal relationship with Indian tribes." Id.
25 C.F.R. §§ 211.7, 225.24.
96.
See 25 C.F.R. pt. 211 (for IMLA); 25 C.F.R. pt. 225 (for IMDA).
97.
U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN,
98.
COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE: INDIAN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT:
POOR MANAGEMENT BY BIA HAS HINDERED ENERGY DEVELOPMENT, GAO-15-502,

24-25 (June 2015), availableat http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/
670701 .pdf [hereinafter GAO- 15-502].
Id. at 25.
99.
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bureaucracy administering those laws and regulations imposes
significant delays and costs on the development of Indian lands.'0 0
Although tribes expressed concern during the development of the Final
Rule that its requirements would add even more costs and delays to these
existing regulatory challenges, the BLM instead maintained a consistent
focus on the need for uniformity between the regulation of federal and
Indian lands.
C. TribalRegulation
In recognition of their unique interests in Indian lands, a number
of tribes have sought to assume greater control over the regulation of
environmental concerns on their reservations."o' Although Indian tribes
retain inherent sovereign authority to do so, their ability to regulate the
conduct of non-Indians on their reservations is limited and, therefore,
tribes have also sought the delegation of federal authority through socalled Treatment as State provisions of various federal environmental
statutes, such as the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts.' 02 As a result of the
2005 amendment to the SDWA described above, the EPA does not have
any federal authority to delegate to tribes to regulate fracking but, just
like their state and local government counterparts, some tribes have
adopted laws and regulations related to fracking operations in lieu of a
broader federal regulatory scheme.' 0 3

100. Id. (citing one estimate that the development of Indian lands costs
approximately sixty-five percent more than development of other lands not subject
to the same regulatory framework).
101. See, e.g., Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Examining Tribal
Environmental Law, 39 COLUM. J. ENVTL. LAW 42, 63-94 (2014) (surveying
environmental laws from seventy-four tribes in Arizona, Montana, New York and
Oklahoma).
102. Id. at 53-59 (describing inherent tribal authority and delegation of
Federal authority for the development of tribal environmental laws); Elizabeth Ann
Kronk Warner, Tribes as Innovative Environmental 'Laboratories',86 U. COLO. L.
REv. 789, 809-11 (surveying tribes with TAS status under various statutes).
103. See, e.g., MHA Energy Division Resolutions, MHA ENERGY,
http://www.mhanation.com/main2/departments/mha-energy-division/mhaenergydiv
isionresolutions.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2015) (compiling various tribal
resolutions related to energy development on MHA Nation lands); ASSINIBOINE AND
Sioux TRIBES OF THE FORT PECK RESERVATION, FORT PECK TRIBES COMPREHENSIVE
2,
available
at
JUSTICE,
title
22,
ch.
CODE
OF
http://www.fptc.org/ccoj/title.22/chapters/chapter2.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2016)
(requiring a tribal permit for underground injection activities, in conjunction with
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The BLM waded into this regulatory environment when
promulgating its Final Rule. This article next provides a detailed review
of the Agency's rulemaking process, with particular focus on the issues
raised by tribes in light of the initial and revised proposed versions and
BLM's Final Rule.
IV. THE BLM'S FRACKING RULE
Although it was issued in March 2015, work on the BLM's Final
Rule began as early as November 2010 when then-Secretary Ken Salazar
hosted a public forum on hydraulic fracturing. " In kicking off that
forum, Secretary Salazar focused on the need for greater disclosure of the
components used in fracking fluids and described the Department's
objective as seeking to "reassure the American public that what we are
doing is in fact safe and is in fact protective of the environment." 05 At
that time, Secretary Salazar and officials within the DOI were focused on
the development of natural gas reserves in the context of national energy
policy and, aside from considering requirements for disclosure of
fracking chemicals, were not clearly committed to a broad approach to
regulating fracking.106 Importantly, although the forum that began
discussion and consideration of what became the Final Rule included
input from various industry and State regulatory participants, no tribal

tribe's TAS authority under SDWA); S. UTE INDIAN TRIBE, RESOLUTION No. 201598 (June 16, 2015), available at http://www.suitdoe.com/Documents/
HydraulicFracturingRegulations.pdf, adopting S. UTE INDIAN TRIBE, HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING AND CHEMICAL DISCLOSURE REGULATIONS (June 16, 2015), available
at http://www.suitdoe.com/Documents/ HydraulicFracturingRegulations.pdf
(adopting tribal regulations governing fracking operations on the reservation in
response to the BLM's Final Rule).

104. Bureau of Land Management's Final Hydraulic FracturingRule,
114th Cong.

_ (statement of Neil Kornze, Dir., Bureau of Land Mgmt., at 2-3),

availableat http://naturalresources.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
kornzetestimony.pdf, U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, Press Release: Salazar Holds
Forum to Examine Best Practices for Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas
Production (Nov. 30, 2010), available at https://www.doi.gov/news/
pressreleases/Salazar-Holds-Forum-to-Examine-Best-Practices-for-HydraulicFracturing-in-Oil-and-Natural-Gas- Production.
105. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, NWX-DEPT OF INTERIOR-NBC 4 (Nov. 30,
2010) (transcript from November 30, 3010 Fracking Forum), available at
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/news/pressreleases/upload/Fracking
_Forum_2011-l l-30Transcript.pdf.
106. Id. at 3-4 (comments of Secretary Salazar).
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representatives participated as panelists.1 o 7 In addition, while the forum
discussed the interaction of then-current BLM rules with the state
regulatory schemes of Wyoming and New Mexico, there was no mention
of how the BLM rules might interact with Indian Country."0 s
A. InitialProposedRule
Following the initial public forum, the BLM held forums in
North Dakota, Arkansas, and Colorado throughout April 2011 to gather
additional public input regarding its intent to address concerns over
fracking.' 0 9 Unlike the engagement of tribes in drafting the initial IMLA
and IMDA regulations,1 0 it was not until after these forums and just over
a year after Secretary Salazar convened the initial public forum that the
BLM sought to engage in any tribal consultation about fracking or
potential rulemaking."' These initial tribal consultation meetings began
in January 2012; however, according to the BLM, the initial proposed
rule had already been drafted by that time.1 2 Rather than engage and
involve tribes in discussion of whether any rule was necessary and, if so,
how it could address issues of importance to the tribes or incorporate
tribal comments into an initial draft, the BLM instead sought
consultation with tribes about how a BLM rule may "affect Indian
activities, practices, or beliefs if it were to be applied to particular

107.

Id. at 12-14, 52-54 (introducing panelists).

108. Id. at 63-82.
109. 80 Fed. Reg. at 16,131. The Final Rule also mentions 2011
recommendations from the Natural Gas Subcommittee of the Secretary of Energy's
Advisory Board "that the BLM undertake a rulemaking to ensure well integrity,
water protection, and adequate public disclosure"; however, review of the initial 90day and final reports of that Subcommittee do not demonstrate such specific
recommendations. Improving the Safety & EnvironmentalPerformance of Hydraulic
Fracturing, NATURAL GAS SUBCOMM. OF THE SEC'Y OF ENERGY ADVISORY BD.,
SAFETY OF SHALE GAS DEV. (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.shalegas.energy.gov.
I10. See supra Section 1Il.B.
111. 80 Fed. Reg. at 16,132 (describing four regional tribal consultation
meetings but also noting that "[t]he BLM distributed copies of a draft rule to affected
federally recognized tribes in January 2012.")
112. Id. The Opening Brief for the Federal Appellants filed in the appeal
of the injunction issued by Judge Skavdahl pending before the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit also suggests that the rule was already
drafted, but not published, before any tribal consultation took place. Opening Br. for
the Fed. Appellants at 49, Wyoming v. Jewell, (10th Cir. filed Mar. 21, 2016) (No.
15-8126).
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This approach prompted significant

concern from tribal leaders, some of whom expressed extreme frustration
that it appeared the BLM had drafted its proposed rule and prepared it for
publication before even notifying tribes. 114 Such concerns were
particularly pointed in light of a Tribal Consultation Policy adopted by
the DOI only a month beforehand."'
Undeterred by tribal concerns with the substance of its
consultation process (or lack thereof), the BLM forged ahead and
published its initial proposed rule in the Federal Register in May 2012.116
The purported need for the rule in its initial form largely tracked the
concerns raised by Secretary Salazar nearly a year and a half earlier, with
the rule's summary stating, it "is necessary to provide useful information
to the public and to assure that hydraulic fracturing is conducted in a way
that adequately protects the environment.""' As further justification, the
commentary on the initial proposed rule emphasized the outdated nature
of the BLM's existing regulations, reviewed the quickening pace of
development on federal and tribal lands, and developed a cost-benefit
analysis projected over a ten-year period (2013 to 2022)."8 According to
that analysis, the benefits to be realized from the rule's requirements
regarding increased oversight of wellbore integrity and requirements for
storage of wastewater ranged from twelve million to fifty million dollars
per year while cost estimates ranged from thirty-seven million to fortyfour million dollars per year.' 19 The BLM also estimated a proposed cost
burden "per well stimulation event" of about twelve thousand dollars,
113. Impacts of the Bureau ofLand Management's Hydraulic Fracturing
Rule on Indian Tribal Energy Development: Oversight Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Indian and Alaska Native Aff of the H. Comm. on NaturalRes., Serial
No. 112-106, 12 (Apr. 19, 2012) (statement of Tim Spisak, Deputy Assistant Dir.,
Minerals and Realty Mgmt., BLM).
114. See, e.g., id. at 41, 43-44 (testimony and statement of James M.
"Mike" Olguin, Vice-Chairman, S. Ute Indian Tribal Council, S. Ute Indian Tribe).
115. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3317,
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR POLICY ON CONSULTATION WITH INDIAN TRIBES

(Dec. 1, 2011), available at https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/
tribes/upload/SO-33 17-Tribal-Consultation-Policy.pdf.
116. 77 Fed. Reg. 27,691.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 27,694 ("[a]s stewards of the public lands, and as the
Secretary's regulator for oil and gas leases on Indian lands, the BLM has evaluated
the increased use of well stimulation practices over the last decade and determined
that the existing rules for well stimulation require updating." Id. at 27,699-700).
119. Id. at 27,692, 27,702 (the analysis did not consider potential benefits
from public disclosure of fracking chemicals)
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meaning that the rule would add that cost to each frack job.1 20 With
regard to tribal lands, the support for the initial rule simply noted that the
BLM proposed to apply the same "rules and standards to Indian lands so
that these lands and communities receive the same level of protection
provided for public lands."' 2 ' Aside from that mention of the BLM's
interest in consistency across both tribal and public lands, the
information published within the initial rule paid little attention to tribal
interests.1 2 2
B. Tribal Response to the InitialProposedRule
Upset by the perceived lack of consultation leading up to the
publication of the initial rule, many tribes continued to raise complaints
with both the rulemaking process and the substance of the initial rule
after its publication in May 2012. For example, in commenting on the
initial proposed rule, the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray
Reservation ("Ute Indian Tribe") of Utah expressed concern that the
"BLM continue[d] to make the mistakes of the past by proposing to
impose a national rule based on public interest standards that will
override tribal authority." 23 According to the Ute Indian Tribe, the
additional requirements suggested by the initial proposed rule could
further delay development on its reservation, where "[i]t already takes
about 5 to 20 [sic] times as long to get an oil and gas permit" as
compared to non-tribal lands.1 24 The Council of Energy Resource Tribes
("CERT"), a coalition of tribes engaged in energy production, also
commented on the potentially negative impacts of the initial proposed
rule on tribal energy development.1 25 These concerns were echoed by
other tribes reliant upon energy development for economic purposes,

120.
121.
122.

Id. at 27,702.
Id. at 27,692.
Id. at 27,704-05.

123. UTE INDIAN TRIBE, COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE FOR OIL AND
GAS; WELL STIMULATION, INCLUDING HYDRAULIC FRACTURING, ON FEDERAL AND
INDIAN LAND 2 (Sept. 10, 2012), availableat http://www.regulations.gov/#!
documentDetail;D=BLM-2012-0001-7637 [hereinafter UTE COMMENTS].

124.
125.

Id. at 8.

COUNCIL OF ENERGY RES. TRIBES, CERT LETTER RE COMMENTS TO
HF
RULE
09.10.12,
6-7
(Sept.
10,
2012),
available
at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=BLM-2012-0001-7204 (positing a
guaranteed decline in revenue for tribes and Indian people as a result of the initial
prosed rule) [hereinafter CERT COMMENTS].
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who also urged the BLM to engage in greater tribal consultation to better
address these issues.1 26
Beyond concerns over the potential delays caused by the initial
proposed rule, a number of tribes engaged in energy development also
questioned the legal basis of the BLM's authority to apply the rule to
Indian lands. 127 In opening the discussion section of the publication of
the initial proposed rule, the BLM cited the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act ("FLPMA") as the basis of the Agency's authority to
manage public lands and as establishing the standard-preventing undue
and unnecessary degradation of those lands, the so-called "UUD
standard"-for doing so.' 8 In its comments, the CERT noted that the
definition of "public lands" to which FLPMA applies specifically
excludes "lands held for the benefit of Indians."l 29 Therefore, according
to the CERT, whose argument was representative of the position taken
by other tribes, even though the BLM also cited to both the IMLA and
the IMDA, each of which authorize the Secretary to promulgate
regulations to implement their statutory provisions on Indian lands,1 3 0 the
Secretary could not delegate this authority to the BLM "because under
FLPMA, Indian lands are specifically excluded" from the BLM's
jurisdiction."'
Similarly, the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Nation, the Three
Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation ("MHA Nation") of
North Dakota argued that the BLM did not assume any authority over
leasing on Indian lands until the IMLA regulations were finalized in
1996, which, because it came two decades after FLPMA, was also
prohibited.132 The MHA Nation went on to argue that any attempt by the
BLM to apply the standards applicable to public lands under FLPMA,
126. UTE TRIBE COMMENTS, supra note 123, at 2; MANDAN, HIDATSA,
AND ARIKARA NATION, THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES, FORT BERTHOLD INDIAN
RESERVATION, COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE FOR OIL AND GAS; WELL
STIMULATION, INCLUDING HYDRAULIC FRACTURING, ON FEDERAL AND INDIAN
LANDS
8
(Sept.
10,
2012),
available
at

http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=BLM-2012-0001-7405
[hereinafter MHA COMMENTS]; Impacts of the Bureau of Land Management's
Hydraulic FracturingRule, supra note 113, at 61 (statement of Scott Russell, Sec'y
of the Crow Tribe, Area Vice-President Rocky Mountain Region, Nat'1 Cong. of
Am. Indians).
127. See, e.g., CERT COMMENTS, supra note 125, at 4-5.
128. 77 Fed. Reg. at 27,694; see also, 43 U.S.C. § 1732b.
129. CERT COMMENTS, supra note 125, at 4.
130. 25 U.S.C. §§ 396d, 2107.
131. CERT COMMENTS, supra note 125, at 4-5.
132. MHA COMMENTS, supra note 126, at 3.
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which derive from the general UUD standard, would be inconsistent with
the federal government's fiduciary responsibilities to tribes. 33 Consistent
with tribal concerns over the potential economic impacts, those alleging
a lack of statutory basis for the initial proposed rule urged a return to
tribal consultation to address the unique statutory scheme applicable to
Indian lands and allow greater consideration of the federal trust
relationship toward Indian tribes.1 34
In addition to tribes concerned about the potential for the initial
proposed rule to further delay development, some tribes also expressed
concern that the BLM's rules would interfere with their ability to
sufficiently protect their citizens from the risks of fracking. At a
Congressional oversight hearing just before publication of the initial
proposed rule, for example, the Co-Chairman of the Business Council of
the Eastern Shoshone Tribe of Wyoming made clear that, although his
tribe supported energy development, the "main goal should not be how
quickly we can get permits approved but how do we support safe and
responsible development.""' As such, the primary worry of the tribes on
his reservation was "that the BLM ha[d] shown that they cannot bring
about compliance with existing policies and statutes." 36 Similarly, a
Tribal Council Representative from the Turtle Mountain Band of
Chippewa Indians of North Dakota pointed out that, at the time of the
hearing, his was "the only tribe in this nation [sic] who will not allow
fracking on [their] land" due to water quality concerns.1 37 Nonetheless,
although based on divergent interests, these tribal leaders, like those of
the tribes critical of the rule for its potentially negative impacts on
development, urged a greater role for tribal regulation in place of federal
oversight.13 1

133.

Id. at 4-5 (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225-26

(1983)).
134. See Id at 5; CERT COMMENTS, supra note 125, at 21; UTE
COMMENTS, supra note 123, at 6-7.
135. Impacts of the Bureau ofLand Management's Hydraulic Fracturing
Rule, supra note 113, at 53 (statement of Wes Martel, Co-Chairman, E. Shoshone
Tribe).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 55.
138. Id. at 54 ("[w]e believe a more enhanced regulatory role for the
Tribes is part of the answer."); id. at 57 ("Turtle Mountain people know our land
best, we know our resources, we know what methods of mining and drilling we are
comfortable with, and we are best suited to make the decisions that impact our land
and our people.") (statement of Larry DeCoteau, Tribal Council Rep., Dist. 4, Turtle
Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians).
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After extending the initial comment deadline from one month to
three and receiving comments until September 2010, the BLM went back
to the drawing board on the initial proposed rule."' Prior to doing so, the
Agency engaged in additional tribal consultation sessions in the summer
of 2012, during which tribes continued to express concerns over both the
BLM's consultation during the rulemaking process and the substance of
the initial proposed rule.1 4 0 The results of the additional consultation
sessions and agency analysis became clear with the publication of a
supplemental rule nearly a year later.
C Supplemental Rule
The BLM published its revised fracking rule in the Federal
Register on May 24, 2013, and, in the information published with the
revised rule, sought to address many of the comments raised by tribes
and tribal interests in response to the initial proposed rule.14' For
example, in response to the concerns of energy tribes that the rule would
result in additional delays, the Agency pointed to revisions in the
substance of the rule aimed at reducing administrative burdens.1 42 in
addition, the BLM attempted to better explain its view of the rule's
statutory support and relationship between the rule and Indian Country to
respond to tribal concerns over the Agency's respect for tribal
43
sovereignty and the distinction between federal and Indian lands.1
Like the initial proposed rule, the revised rule primarily focused
on standards related to ensuring wellbore integrity, disclosure of fracking
chemicals, and treatment of wastewater produced through the fracking
process. 4 4 Unlike the stricter technical standards of the initial proposed
rule, however, the revised rule allowed for some additional flexibility in

139.

Oil and Gas; Well Stimulation, Including Hydraulic Fracturing, on

Federal and Indian Lands, Proposed Rule, Extension of Comment Period, 77 Fed.
Reg. 38024 (June 26, 2012).
140. See, e.g., Glenda Embry, Pub. Info. Officer, Consultation Meeting
with BIA and BLM Held at Four Bears on Proposed New Rule on Hydraulic
Fracturing,
MHA
NATION
(July
17,
2012),
http://www.mhanation.com/main2/Home News/HomeNews_2012/News_2012_07
july/news_2012-Julyl7.html.
141. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78
Fed. Reg. 31,636 (May 24, 2013).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 31,639-40.
144. Id. at 31,636.
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meeting those standards.1 45 For example, the revised rule removed the
initial proposed rule's requirement that an operator submit the results of
wellbore integrity testing before fracking and, instead, so long as there
were no indications of other integrity issues, proposed allowing the
submission of a wider variety of cement evaluation information within
thirty days after fracking operations 146 In addition, the revised rule
touted additional reliance on existing state standards, such as Colorado's
protection of trade secrets in the context of chemical disclosures.1 47
Rather than impose it as an additional requirement, the revised rule also
sought additional input as to the costs and benefits of requiring that fluids
flowing back from fracking operations be stored only in closed tanks. 148
Notwithstanding the BLM's attention to the procedural and
administrative burdens of the revised rule, however, the Agency noted
that the rule would still result in costs of twelve to twenty million dollars
annually, a substantial portion of which would result from the cement
testing requirements. 4 91In specifically responding to tribal concerns over
the additional costs imposed by federal regulations applicable to tribal
lands, especially when compared to private lands, the BLM noted in
publishing the revised rule that it was "aware that [despite some reduced
requirements,] the revised proposed rule would nonetheless result in
some higher costs for operators on . . . Indian lands, compared with
compliance costs for hydraulic fracturing on . . . non-Indian lands," but

that those costs were "only one set in a long list of costs that operators
compare to anticipated revenues when deciding whether and how much
to bid on a[n] Indian lease."' 50
In addition to showing greater sensitivity to tribal concerns over
administrative burdens than it had in the initial proposed rule, the BLM
used the publication of the revised proposed rule to respond to tribal

145.

See, e.g., id. at 31,641 (describing a change in the revised rule that

would remove the requirement of a cement bond log prior to a fracking operation
and replace it with a requirement that cement evaluation log be submitted after the
operation, "unless there [we]re problems with the cement job.")
146. Id. at 31,641 (comparing the initial proposed rules, 43 C.F.R. §
3162.3-3(c)(2) (2015) (requiring a Cement Bond Log before fracking), with their
amended version. 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(e)(2), published at, 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,675
(requiring submission within 30 days of completion of fracking operations of a
Cement Evaluation Log, which may be a Cement Bond Log or other "class of tools
that verify the integrity of annular cement bonding")).
147. 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,637.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 31,665.
150. Id. at 31,670.
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concerns over the Agency's statutory authority to promulgate a rule
applicable to Indian lands and the Agency's responsibility to tribes. With
regard to the tribal arguments that Congress, by enacting FLPMA and
excluding Indian lands from the definition of public lands, stripped the
BLM of any authority over Indian lands, the BLM responded that
FLPMA also charges the BLM with the responsibility to carry out other
duties assigned to it by the Secretary or assigned to the Secretary by law
subsequent to FLPMA.'"' Thus, according to the BLM, the Secretary's
authority to regulate leasing on Indian lands under the IMLA and the
IMDA is reaffirmed by FLPMA, and "the Secretary, through the [IMLA
and IMDA] regulations promulgated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs
("BIA"), has assigned to the BLM part of the Secretary's trust
responsibilities to regulate oil and gas operations on those Indian
lands."' 52 To the extent such regulations are viewed by tribes as in
conflict with tribal sovereignty, the Agency noted that other regulations
already apply to oil and gas development on Indian lands, citing the
IMLA and IMDA regulations.' 5 3
Lastly, although the BLM "embrace[d]" the federal policies
supportive of tribal self-determination, the Agency noted in publishing
the revised rule that it had "consistently interpreted" the Secretary's
authority to promulgate rules and regulations under the IMLA to "allow[]
uniform regulations governing mineral resource development on Indian
and Federal lands" and thereby prohibit treating tribes differently by
allowing a tribal opt-out or delegation provision. 14 However, the revised
rule suggested that tribes could assert greater control through the
authority of other federal statutes, such as contracting to assume some of
the BLM's programs pursuant to the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act ("ISDEAA").'s In addition, the revised rule
allowed the BLM to consider a variance "that would allow compliance
with ... tribal requirements to be accepted as compliance with the rule, if

151.

Id. at 31,669 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1731(a), (b) (2012)).

152. Id.
153. Id. (The BLM did not mention the role that tribal input played in the
development of those earlier IMLA and IMDA regulations).
154. Id. at 31,640.
155. Id. Although the ISDEAA allows for the assumption of federal
administrative functions, it does not provide a delegation of federal authority or
recognition of broader tribal regulatory authority. Instead, in the performance of
ISDEAA contracts, "[u]ltimate control remains within the federal government."
Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Self-Determinationat the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV.
777, 786 (2006).

30

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAWREVIEW

Vol. 37

the variance meets or exceeds th[e] rule's standards."l56 In support of the
BLM's unwillingness to recognize tribal authority and exempt tribal
lands from the rule, the BLM maintained that such an exemption "would
require the Secretary . . . to conclude . . . that usable waters in Indian

lands, and the persons who use such waters, are less deserving of
protection than waters and water users on Federal lands."'1 7 In other
words, the BLM could not fulfill its perceived duty to protect Indian
resources by allowing tribes to assume responsibility for such protection.
In crafting the revised rule, the BLM thus refused to consider
whether the revised rule should treat Indian lands differently than federal
lands. Instead, the BLM doubled down on the need for uniform
protection across both federal and Indian lands and its perceived need for
ongoing consistency of statutory interpretation supportive of such
uniformity. Under the revised rule, therefore, tribes remained subject to
the BLM's regulatory authority but could seek a variance from certain
provisions, provided tribal regulations were more stringent than the
BLM's revised rules, or utilize other means to assume responsibility for
carrying out the BLM's functions. But the proposed rule neither
recognized nor allowed tribes to assume any additional regulatory
authority over fracking. As the BLM might have anticipated, the revised
rule did not satisfy many tribes.
D. Tribal Response to the Supplemental Rule
Predictably, and notwithstanding the BLM's efforts to streamline
the administrative burdens from the initial proposed rule, tribes remained
concemed about the revised rule. Energy development-focused tribes
like the MHA Nation and the Ute Indian Tribe reiterated their arguments
about the lack of statutory basis for the BLM's rule and maintained their
positions that the rule would greatly affect, if not eliminate, development
on their reservations.' In addition, the National Congress of American
156.

Id.

157.
158.

78 Fed. Reg. at 31,669.

MANDAN, HIDATSA, AND ARIKARA NATION, THREE AFFILIATED
TRIBES, FORT BERTHOLD INDIAN RESERVATION, COMMENTS ON REVISED PROPOSED
RULE FOR OIL AND GAS; HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON FEDERAL AND INDIAN LANDS

(Aug.
23,
2013),
available
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=BLM-2013-0002-5681;

at
UTE

INDIAN TRIBE, COMMENTS ON SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULE FOR OIL
AND GAS; HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON FEDERAL AND INDIAN LANDS (Aug. 23,

2013), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=BLM-20130002-5658.
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Indians ("NCAI"), a national association of Indian tribes established in
1944, weighed in on behalf of its member tribes and urged the BLM to
engage in meaningful consultation.159 The NCAI noted the passage of
two separate resolutions at two of its national tribal conferences, each of
which demanded that the BLM engage in further dialogue with tribes.1 60
While the NCAI's comments also mentioned the impacts of the
revised rule on energy development in Indian Country, other tribes
expressed greater concern over the impacts of the revised rule on their
authority to regulate and restrict fracking on their lands. The Standing
Rock Sioux Tribe ("Standing Rock") of North Dakota, for example,
blasted the revised rule for its failure to comply with the federal
government's trust obligation to tribes because the rule did not
adequately protect Standing Rock's water resources, public health, or
environment.1 6 ' In addition, Standing Rock expressed grave concern that
the BLM lacked adequate authority to effectively enforce the less-thanadequate protections provided by the revised rule.162 In doing so,
Standing Rock noted that "[t]ribal sovereignty is jeopardized when
federal agencies impose rules governing Indian Country." 6 3 Instead, the
"BLM should defer to Tribal law [sic] for compliance purposes,
consistent with the federal trust responsibility." 64
Like Standing Rock, the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the
Fort Peck Reservation ("Fort Peck Tribes") of Montana, whose lands lie
on the western edge of the Bakken field and, at the time, faced

159. Letter from Jackie Pata, Exec. Dir., Nat'1 Cong. of Am. Indians to
Neil Kornze, Principal Deputy Dir., Bureau of Land Mgmt. (Aug. 23, 2013),
available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=BLM-2013-00024214 [hereinafter NCAI Comments].

160.

Id.

STANDING ROCK Sioux TRIBE, STANDING ROCK Sioux TRIBE
COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE FOR HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON FEDERAL AND
INDIAN LAND 1 (Aug. 23, 2013), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!
-

161.

documentDetail;D=BLM-2013-0002-5573.

162.

Id. at 4-5.

163.
164.

Id. at 4.
Id. at 5; see also Letter from Sally J. Kniffin, Envtl. Specialist,

Saginaw-Chippewa Indian Tribe to Dir., Bureau of Land Mgmt. (Aug. 23, 2013),
availableat http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=BLM-2013-00020139; E. SHOSHONE TRIBE, EASTERN SHOSHONE TRIBE'S COMMENTS ON PROPOSED
RULE: OIL AND GAS; HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON FEDERAL AND INDIAN LANDS

(Aug. 23, 2013), availableat
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=BLM-2013-0002-5575.

32

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37

'

significant potential development,16 1 supported the need for additional
protection from the risks posed by fracking.' 66 In commenting on the
revised rule, the Fort Peck Tribes provided detailed critiques of many of
the substantive provisions and offered their own perspective based on
their experience with regulating fracking on their lands."' The Fort Peck
Tribes' comments also highlighted the inadequacy of the new variance
process proposed by the revised rule. 168 In May 2012, the Fort Peck
Tribes adopted their own requirements for oil and gas leases on the
reservation, which would mandate the use of best management practices
for noise and light pollution, protection of ground and surface water, and
other development operations.1 69 The Fort Peck Tribes noted that the
revised rule appeared to allow for the adoption of these tribal rules as
"variances" by the BLM; however, it was "immediately apparent that a
procedure of some sort [was] necessary."' With oil development
"loom[ing] across [the Fort Peck] Reservation's border," the revised rule
left the Fort Peck Tribes looking for a "place to initiate [a] dialogue"
with BLM on the adoption of a variance that could incorporate their own
tribal standards for ensuring protection of their lands. 7
Therefore, although the BLM revised its initial proposed rule to
reduce administrative burdens, the revised rule still fell short of tribal
expectations both for tribes seeking to expedite energy development and
those desiring greater regulatory authority to restrict such development
and ensure protection of their lands from the risks of fracking. In
addition, although the BLM touted the inclusion of a rule allowing the
Agency to approve a variance for tribes, there was no process for
discussing or incorporating such variances into the BLM rule, nor did the
165. Since 2013, the falling price of oil has virtually eliminated the
prospect of economic gains from oil and gas development on the reservation of the
Fort Peck Tribes. See Matthew Frank, Over a Barrel: The Boom and Bust, the
Promise and Peril, of the Bakken, MISSOULA INDEPENDENT (Mar. 24, 2016)
available
at
http://missoulanews.bigskypress.com/missoula/over-abarrel/Content?oid=2744707.
166. FORT PECK TRIBE OFFICE OF ENVTL. PROT., COMMENTS ON THE
PLB's PROPOSED RULE: "OIL AND GAS; HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON FEDERAL AND
INDIAN LANDS" (Aug. 28, 2013), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!

documentDetail;D=BLM-2013-0002-5719.
167. Id. at 5 (discussing use of open pits).

168.

Id. at 15.

169. Id. at 16-18 (Resolution #26-790-2012-05 and the accompanying
best management practices are attached to the Fort Peck Tribes' comment letter to
BLM).
170. Id. at 15.
171. Id.
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revised rule suggest that a variance would support tribal authority. Thus,
although tribes had, in the time between the initial proposed and the
revised rule, sought additional consultation with the BLM and
consistently urged the Agency to demonstrate greater deference to tribal
sovereign authority, the revised rule did little to accommodate tribal
concerns.172 After another extended comment period on the revised rule
closed on August 23, 2013, tribes awaited the next efforts of the BLM.17 3
E. The FinalRule
The BLM published its final rule on March 26, 2015, nearly two
years after it had published the revised rule and almost five years since
Secretary Salazar held the initial public forum on fracking.174 The
172. These concerns were neatly summed up by the NCAI's comments
on the revised rule, which demanded that any rule issued by BLM:
*
Respect that the United States has a unique legal and
political relationship with Indian tribes and a special relationship
with Alaska Native entities as provided in the Constitution of the
United States, treaties, and federal statutes. These relationships
extend to the federal government's historic preservation activities,
mandating that federal consultation with tribes be meaningful, in
good faith, and entered into on a government-to-government
basis;
*
Acknowledge the sovereign authority of Indian tribes to
make decisions about activities occurring on their own lands by
ordinance, resolution, or other action authorized under such
constitution or bylaw;
*
Provide assistance, either directly or through contract, to
interested Indian tribes in the development of tribal regulatory
capacity and the development of tribal hydraulic fracturing
regulations; and that the proposed regulation's provision on
variances should be amended to provide that tribal regulation and
procedures may replace the federal regulations, provided that the
tribal regulations are consistent with the objectives of the federal
regulations;
*
Affirm that Indian lands are not public lands as defined in
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976; and
*
Allow tribes to opt out of federal regulation and use their
own regulations so that tribal regulatory authority is maximized
and regulatory duplication is avoided.
NCAI Comments, supra note 159, at 2.
173. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands,
Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Extension of Comment Period, 78
Fed. Reg. 34,611 (June 10, 2013).
174. 80 Fed. Reg. 16,128.
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information published with the Final Rule largely tracked that of the
revised rule and the substance of the Final Rule itself included only slight
variations on the requirements proposed by the revised rule. 17' The Final
Rule's significant substantive changes allowed some additional
flexibility for testing wellbore integrity, revised the disclosure
requirements for fracking chemicals, and, subject to very limited
exceptions, required the storage of fracking wastewater in tanks instead
of lined pits. 176 The Final Rule also offered some additional clarity on the
revised rule's variance provisions and added language specifically
prohibiting appeal of the BLM's decision on a proposed variance, which
decision remained solely within the Agency's discretion.1 7 7
As had the minimal substantive changes made to the revised rule
by the Final Rule, the BLM's justification for the Final Rule and
treatment of the issues raised by tribes throughout the rulemaking
process largely tracked the Agency's earlier statements.7 7 Like the
revised rule, the Final Rule largely relied upon the BLM's stated need to
update its own regulations in light of the expanding use of fracking and
set forth the cost-benefit analysis of the Rule. A separate Regulatory
Impact Analysis published contemporaneously with the Final Rule cited
to "Public Concern" expressed at its 2010 public forum and follow-up
public meetings in 2011.179 The Regulatory Impact Analysis also detailed
the estimated cost impacts of the Final Rule and concluded that, across
all tribal lands, the additional annual incremental cost of the Rule would
be approximately ten million dollars, with the greatest impacts on the Ute
Indian Reservation (1.2 million dollars) and the Fort Berthold
Reservation of the MHA Nation (6.6 million dollars).' 80 Nowhere did the
BLM's Regulatory Impact Analysis consider or even mention tribal
concerns regarding the effect that the Final Rule may have on tribal
sovereignty.
Similarly, the Final Rule summarily dismissed tribal input
regarding the need to treat Indian lands separately and differently from
175. Compare, e.g., 78 Fed. Reg. 31,637, with 80 Fed. Reg. at 16,128.
176. 80 Fed. Reg. at 16,129-30.
177. Id. at 16140, 16,221.
178. Compare, e.g., sections describing the Agency's compliance, with
Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000), and Consultation and
Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments from the Revised Rule, 78 Fed. Reg.
31,669, 31,669-70, and Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 16,211-12.
179. U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING RULE 8 (Mar. 26, 2015), available at http://www.
regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=BLM-2015-0001-0002.
180. Id. at 83-84, 87.
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federal lands. Repeating its refrain from the revised rule, the BLM stated
in the Final Rule that it viewed treating federal and Indian lands
differently as inconsistent with its "responsibilities under [the] IMLA,"
specifically the provision authorizing the Secretary to promulgate
regulations applicable to mineral development on Indian lands."' The
BLM also reiterated that its authority for regulating Indian lands
stemmed from laws other than FLPMA.'8 2 In an enlightening departure
from the justification for the revised rule, however, the BLM included
with the publication of the Final Rule a new section addressing "Tribal
Issues" in which the Agency admitted that, while adoption and
implementation of the Final Rule would not be "the only possible way to
carry out the Secretary's trust responsibilities under the Indian mineral
statutes," the BLM viewed establishing a parallel regulatory scheme
within the BIA as the only other option.' The BLM also made clear its
view of the federal trust responsibility toward tribes, stating that "[t]he
BLM believes it is fulfilling its part of the Secretary's trust
responsibilities by requiring operations on Indian lands to meet the same
standards as those on federal lands."'84 This conception of the trust
responsibility further prevented the BLM from considering any means to
allow greater exercise of tribal authority under the Final Rule because
"the BLM has no way of terminating the Secretary's trust responsibilities
for hydraulic fracturing operations if a tribe were to opt-out [of the Final
Rule] or if the BLM [deferred to] a tribe . . . implementing its own

program."' Thus, in the BLM's view, the Agency's application of a
uniform standard to both federal and Indian lands constituted the
fulfillment of its trust responsibility and anything less than ensuring such
uniform protection, even in recognition of tribal authority, would be an
abdication of that responsibility.
The "Tribal Issues" section continued with the BLM's response
to tribal criticism of the proposed variance provisions, noting that some
tribes had suggested that those provisions did not comply with "policies
promoting tribal sovereignty, self-determination, and the . . . trust

responsibility."'8 6 The BLM again stated that it viewed the Final Rule as
fulfilling the federal government's trust responsibility by ensuring
identical protections for Indian and federal lands.' In addition, because
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

80 Fed. Reg. at 16,132 (citing 25 U.S.C. §396(d)).
Id. at 16,137, 16,184.
Id. at 16,185.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the variance provisions allowed the Agency to consider applying tribal
regulations if stricter than the Final Rule's requirements, those provisions
"accord[ ] with tribal self-determination to the extent that could be
expected from a rule governing hydraulic fracturing operations."'
The Final Rule confirmed the BLM's commitment to updating
its fracking regulations and doing so in a manner that prioritized
uniformity across federal and Indian lands without any significant
distinction. As with the initial proposed and then revised rule, the BLM
highlighted public input received in 2010 and 2011 as justification for
the Final Rule and largely dismissed or minimized tribal input received
through the Agency's reactive consultations, begun in January 2012.
Critically, the Final Rule also cemented the BLM's view of its trust
responsibility to Indian tribes as ensuring protection of their resources to
the same extent the resources of public lands are protected and, because
of that responsibility, there could be no room for the Final Rule to defer
to tribal authority over Indian lands.
Importantly, as this detailed review of the process leading to the
Final Rule demonstrates, tribes were largely uniform in their criticism of
the BLM's inflexible approach to regulating on Indian lands even though
their individual tribal interests varied. Comments from the tribes facing
the greatest potential economic impacts, like the Ute Indian Tribe and the
MHA Nation, and those primarily concerned with potential
environmental impacts, like Standing Rock, both emphasized the need
for increased tribal authority to ensure appropriate regulation of fracking
on Indian lands. Short of broad recognition of tribal authority, tribes also
expected to be afforded a greater role in consulting and coordinating with
the BLM in the development of appropriate standards for their lands.
Unlike the broader policy debate over the risks and benefits of fracking,
the BLM's Final Rule and the process through which the Agency
developed that rule raised significant issues for tribes, regardless of each
tribe's position on fracking. These issues centered on the BLM's
misconception of the unique federal-tribal relationship and the Agency's
respect for tribal sovereignty and self-determination. As described in the
next section, the BLM's approach was more consistent with a bygone era
of federal-tribal relations and failed to align with the federal
government's growing recognition that its trust responsibility requires
support for and promotion of tribal sovereignty. This incongruence is
particularly acute when analyzing the Final Rule according to the BLM's
standards for tribal consultation, the Final Rule's statutory authority, and

188.

Id.
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how other agencies view the federal trust responsibility with respect to
the promulgation of their rules and regulations.
V. AN UNFORTUNATE THROWBACK
By failing to adequately account for tribal concerns in
developing the Final Rule, the BLM's efforts mark an unfortunate return
to the bad old days of federal dominance and paternalism in Indian
affairs. The roots of such paternalism were sewn in Chief Justice
Marshall's characterization of tribes as "domestic dependent nations"
and, although federal policy swung wildly back and forth between the
extremes of removal, assimilation and allotment, reorganization and
termination of tribes over nearly the next 150 years, the underlying tenet
of each of those policies was that tribes were generally incapable of
handling their own affairs.' 89 Even in the 1930s era of the Indian
Reorganization Act, when the federal government sought to enhance
tribal sovereign authority through the restoration of tribal lands and
support of tribal governments, the terms of many tribal constitutions
required federal review and approval and the BIA maintained a
significant and dominant presence on many reservations.' 90
Following the failure of the federal termination policies of the
1950s, the historical notions of federal dominance and paternalism were
largely repudiated with the dawn of the self-determination era in the mid1970s. As President Richard M. Nixon made clear in his landmark 1970
address to Congress on Indian affairs, neither termination nor overbearing federal paternalism is the right approach to Indian affairs:
Federal termination errs in one direction, Federal
paternalism errs in the other. Only by clearly rejecting
189.

The schizophrenic history of federal Indian policy has been well

documented. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at §§ 1.03-1.06, 23-93. With
regard to paternalism in particular, see Tadd M. Johnson & James Hamilton, SelfGovernance of Indian Tribes: From Paternalism to Empowerment, 27 CONN. L.
REv. 1251, 1252-622 (1995).
190. CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE 62, 190-91 (2006). The
historic relationship between the BIA and tribes explains the BIA's alternate but oftheard name around Indian Country: "Bossing Indians Around." See, e.g., Deborah
Ziff, A 'Historic Day' at Pueblo, ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL (Mar. 15, 2013),
available at http://www.abqjournal.com/178475/news/a-historic-day-at-pueblo.html
(quoting then-Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs Kevin Washburn as recognizing
that "not that long ago ...
tribal leaders complained that BIA stood for 'Bossing
Indians Around'); Robert McCarthy, The Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Federal
Trust Obligation to American Indians, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 4-15 (2004).
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both of these extremes can we achieve a policy which
truly serves the best interests of the Indian people. Selfdetermination among the Indian people can and must be
encouraged without the threat of eventual termination."'
In calling for a new federal commitment to tribal self-determination,
President Nixon noted that the policy was "what the Indians themselves
have long been telling us" and that it was time to "create the conditions
for a new era in which the Indian future is determined by Indian acts and
Indian decisions."l 9 2
The federal commitment to self-determination called for by
President Nixon in 1970 resulted in significant changes in the federaltribal relationship, although those changes came gradually. For example,
the 1975 passage of the ISDEAA authorized tribes to contract with the
federal government to assume responsibility over various federal
programs provided for Indians.193 Tribes have used these agreements to
take on administrative functions related to management of natural
resources, such as forest and rangelands, which had previously been
performed by the BIA.194 This assumption of greater responsibility, if not
greater authority, 195 enhanced tribal management capability and although
the federal agencies tasked with carrying out this commitment have often
frustrated the practice of engaging in self-determination, particularly on
funding issues,' 96 the ISDEAA thereby began a gradual shift of the
federal-tribal relationship away from its traditional federal paternalism.
This shift in the federal-tribal relationship also played out in the
context of energy development. The IMDA was passed in 1982-just
seven years after ISDEAA-and was largely the result of tribal efforts to
191. Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, 213 Pub. Papers
564, 567-76 (July 8, 1970) (President Richard M. Nixon).
192. Id. at 565; see also, WILKINSON, supra note 190, at 189-90 (quoting
tribal leader questioning federal oversight in 1919).
193. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450a, 450b(j) (2012) (these contracts are often referred
to as "638 contracts" in light of the ISDEAA's public law number, 93-638).
194. See Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen D. Osborne, The History,
Status, and Future of Tribal Self Governance Under the Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act, 39 AM. IND. L. REV. 1 (2015).
195. See, e.g., Washburn, supra note 155, at 786 (existing selfdetermination efforts are important to shift "day-to-day control" over federal funds
to tribes even if they do not "disrupt the allocation of power between the federal
government and tribes.")
196. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 638 (2005);
Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 189, at 1263-78; Strommer & Osborne, supra note
194, at 48-61.
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assume greater control over mineral leasing than allowed by the
Reorganization-era IMLA.'" As a result, although the IMDA still
requires secretarial approval of mineral development agreements and
consideration of whether those agreements are in the tribe's best
interests, 198 tribes were able to engage in much broader and more
independent negotiation of agreements related to the development of
their mineral resources. Thus, tribes could move from passive lessors of
their minerals to active participants in their development.19
More recent efforts further emphasized tribal self-determination
and sovereignty over energy development on tribal lands. The 2005
Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act
("ITEDSDA") authorized Tribal Energy Resource Agreements
("TERA"), which once negotiated and entered into between an Indian
tribe and the Secretary, would authorize a tribe to enter into a variety of
energy-related agreements, such as leases and rights-of-way, without
subsequent secretarial approval of each individual agreement.2 00
Although a complex capacity determination and application process,
among other issues, have so far deterred any tribe from entering a TERA,
the ITEDSDA's expansion of tribal authority over energy development is
representative of the continuing evolution of the self-determination
era.20 1 The Helping Expedite and Advance Responsible Tribal
Homeownership Act ("HEARTH Act"), 202 enacted in 2012, represents a
similar landmark of federal commitment to tribal self-determination.
Pursuant to the HEARTH Act, a tribe can approve leases of its surface
lands, so long as the Secretary has approved the tribe's rules for doing so

197.

See Carla Fredericks, Plenary Energy, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 789,

798-802 (2015).
198. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2102(a), 2103(b) (2012).
199. See Royster, supra note 73, at 585-89.
200. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3506 (2012).
201. GAO-15-502, supra note 98. Although supportive of tribal selfdetermination, the ITEDSDA's implementing regulations prevent tribes from
assuming responsibility for "inherently Federal functions." 25 C.F.R. § 224.52(c)
(2008). The precise definition of this term remains unclear as does the scope of
federal regulations that would remain applicable to a tribe that has entered a TERA.
GAO-15-502, supra note 98, at 32-33. Thus, despite the Agency's suggestion in the
Final Rule that tribes could "assert more control over oil and gas operations on tribal
land by entering" a TERA, tribes may be unable to assume any of BLM's regulatory
authority over fracking under a TERA, particularly in light of BLM's view of its
duty to provide federal oversight for fracking. 80 Fed. Reg. at 16,132.
202. 25 U.S.C. § 415(h) (2012).
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and those rules are "consistent with" federal leasing regulations. 20 3
Unlike TERAs, over twenty tribes have taken advantage of the HEARTH
Act and exercise largely independent authority to lease their surface
lands.204
Thus, the shift away from federal paternalism and toward federal
support of tribal governance and sovereignty has now pervaded federal
policy for a generation. As tribes have exercised expanding authority,
their capacity for doing so successfully has correspondingly expanded as
well. This expansion in the exercise of actual sovereignty, real nation
building, has proven to have significantly positive economic and social
effects.205
Ultimately, when viewed in light of the continuing efforts of the
federal government to promote tribal authority and self-determination,
the BLM's response to concerns over the Final Rule raised by tribes
through the rulemaking process is, at best, a throwback to earlier policy
eras of federal dominance. The inappropriateness of this approach is
particularly clear when analyzed in the context of the Agency's
obligations to tribal consultation, adherence to statutory authority, and
the trust responsibility.
A. Tribal Consultation
The federal government's commitment to consultation with
tribal governments is not a new phenomenon, as evidenced by Congress'
1982 mandate to the Secretary in the IMDA.20 6 After reviewing a
comprehensive history of the federal government's approach to tribal
consultation, from treaty-making to self-determination era statutory
requirements and recent court decisions, Professor Robert Miller
203. Id. § 415(h)(3)(B)(i). The HEARTH Act is limited to the lease of
tribal surface lands and does not currently address mineral leasing. Even if mineral
leasing were to be included in the HEARTH Act, tribal leasing regulations would
likely need to include reference to the BLM's regulations in order to maintain
"consistency" with the current IMDA and IMLA leasing regulations.
204. GAO-15-502, supra note 98, at I n.33; Bureau of Indian Aff.
HEARTH Act of 2012, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, http://www.indianaffairs.
gov/WhoWeAre/BIA/OTS/HEARTH/index.htm (last visited December 18, 2015).
205. Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Two Approaches to the
Development of Native Nations: One Works, the Other Doesn't, in REBUILDING
NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 6-7 (Miriam
Jorgensen, ed. 2007) (comparing the "Nation Building Approach" with the
"Standard Approach" that dominated two centuries of federal Indian policy and
concluding that the former "works" while the latter "has proven a failure").
206. 25 U.S.C. § 2107; see infra Section IllI.B.
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concluded that "the duty of federal consultation and consent with Indian
nations is a very well established legal principle in the history, statutes,
administrative regulations, and case law of the United States." 207 Other
commentators have suggested that the duty of the federal government to
consult with Indian tribes should be considered a necessary procedural
component of the federal government's trust responsibility. 208
In conjunction with the self-determination era, the Executive
Branch has in recent years committed to ensuring consultation with
Indian tribes regarding matters that may affect their interests. This
commitment is expressed through a series of Executive Orders and
Memoranda issued by President William J. Clinton,20 9 and reaffirmed by
Presidents George W. Bush2 10 and Barack H. Obama.2 1 1 President
Obama's 2009 Presidential Memorandum demanded of his
Administration "regular and meaningful consultation and collaboration
with tribal officials in policy decision that have tribal implications. "212
order to carry through on that mandate, the Memorandum reaffirmed
President Clinton's earlier Executive Order and required that each
Executive agency develop "a detailed plan of actions" to implement that
Executive Order within 90 days of November 9, 2009.213 Largely in
response to that directive, the DOI published notice and sought
comments on a proposed Department of the Interior Policy on

207. Robert J. Miller, Consultation or Consent: The United States Duty
to Confer with American Indian Governments, 91 N.D. L. REv. _, at *17 (2015)
(forthcoming publication), availableat
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2666687.
208. Colette Routel & Jeffrey Holth, Toward Genuine Tribal
Consultation in the 21st Century, 46 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 417, 435-36 (2013).
209. Enhancing the Intergovernmental Partnership, Exec. Order No.
12,875, 58 Fed. Reg. 58,903 (Oct. 26, 1993); Government to Government
Relationships with Native American Tribal Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (May
4, 1994); Indian Sacred Sites, Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed Reg. 26,771 (May 24,
2006); Consultation and Cooperation with Indian Tribal Government, Exec. Order
No. 13,084, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,655 (May 14, 1998); Consultation and Coordination
with Indian Tribal Governments, Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249
(Nov. 6, 2000).
210. Memorandum on Government-to-Government Relationship with
Tribal Governments, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2177 (Sept. 23, 2004).
211. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies: Tribal Consultation, 74 Fed. Reg. 57,879 (Nov. 9, 2009); see also Miller,
supra note 207, at *17-20.
212. 74 Fed. Reg. at 57,881.
213. Id.
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Consultation with Indian Tribes. 2 14 Secretary Salazar issued the DOI's
policy through Secretarial Order 3317 on December 1, 2011.215 The
requirements of the departmental policy were incorporated into the
Department's Manual of Operations ("Departmental Manual") on
November 9, 2015.216
Like the broader requirements of the Executive Order and
Presidential Memorandum, the Departmental Manual requires that
agencies within the DOI are "open and candid with tribal government(s)
during consultations and incorporate tribal views in their decision
making processes." 2 17 The Manual further requires that consultation
begin "as early as possible when [an agency is] considering a
Departmental action with tribal implications and provide Indian tribes a
meaningful opportunity to participate in the consultation process."218
Furthermore, the Manual encourages the use of various methods of
engagement, including negotiated rulemaking.219 Each of these
requirements track the directives of Executive Order 13,175, issued in
2000.220

Importantly, Executive Order 13,175 and the subsequent Obama
Presidential Memorandum disclaim the creation of any legally
enforceable right or benefit by virtue of the establishment of the
consultation requirements.2 21 In light of these disclaimers, tribes have
214. Policy on Consultation with Indian Tribes, 76 Fed. Reg. 28,446
(May 17, 2011).
215. U.S. SEC'Y OF THE INTERIOR, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR POLICY
ON CONSULTATION WITH INDIAN TRIBES, ORDER NO. 3317 (Dec. 1, 2011), available
at https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/tribes/
upload/SO-3317-Tribal-Consultation-Policy.pdf.
216. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR POLICY ON
CONSULTATION WITH INDIAN TRIBES AND ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS pt. 512,
ch. 4 (Nov. 9, 2015), available at http://elips.doi.gov/ELIPS/DocView.aspx?id=4220

[hereinafter

POLICY ON CONSULTATION]; DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, PROCEDURES FOR
CONSULTATION WITH INDIAN TRIBES pt. 512, ch. 5 (Nov. 9, 2015), available at
http://elips.doi.gov/ELIPS/DocView.aspx?id=4218 [hereinafter PROCEDURES FOR
CONSULTATION].
217. PROCEDURES FOR CONSULTATION, supra note 216, at pt. 512, ch.

5.4(A).
218. Id. at pt. 512, ch. 5.5(A)(1).
219. Id. at pt. 512, ch. 5.5(A)(2); see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570a (2012).
220. Compare, e.g., PROCEDURES FOR CONSULTATION, supra note 216, at
pt. 512, ch. 5.5(A)(1), with Exec. Order No. 13,175, § 5(b)(2)(A), 65 Fed. Reg. at
67,250.
221. Exec. Order No. 13,175, § 10, 65 Fed. Reg. at 67252; Memorandum
for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: Tribal Consultation, 74 Fed.
Reg. 57,881, 57,882 (Nov. 5, 2009).
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often relied upon separate statutory authorities requiring consultation,
such as the National Historic Preservation Act ("NHPA"), to support
challenges to federal agency action based on a lack of adequate
consultation.222 That act and its implementing regulations focus on the
necessity to ensure adequate tribal input before the approval of projects
by a federal agency that may impact areas of historical or cultural
significance.223 Tribes have successfully pursued injunction of certain
federal actions where the federal agencies authorizing those actions
failed to comply with the statutory or regulatory standards.224 Even in
these instances, however, detailed judicial review of the quality of tribal
consultation efforts by federal agencies can be rare.22 5
Nonetheless, a United States Federal District Court Judge for the
District of Wyoming, in preliminarily enjoining the Final Rule based on
a challenge filed by numerous states and joined by the Ute Indian Tribe,
found "merit" in the Ute Indian Tribe's argument that the BLM's tribal
consultation on the Final Rule failed to comply with the terms of the
Department of Interior Manual.226 In doing so, the court relied upon the
timing of the BLM's consultation and specifically noted that the BLM
had already engaged in significant public discussion and drafted the rule
before seeking to consult with tribes.227 This offered the tribes
opportunity for input that amounted to "little more than that offered to
the public in general" and was not the "extra, meaningful efforts"
required by the Department Manual.228 In addition, the district court
found it critical that tribal consultation resulted in only two minimal
changes to the Final Rule from the revised version that had been
previously proposed.229 Based on these findings, the court concluded the
BLM's failure to comply with the Departmental Manual amounted to an

222. 54 U.S.C. § 302706(b) (2012); Miller, supra note 207, at *15-17
nn.80-92 (collecting cases).
223. 54 U.S.C. § 302706(b); 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.2-800.6.
224. See, e.g., Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 469 F.3d 768 (9th Cir.
2006); Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Reservation v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior,
755 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (S.D. Cal. 2010).
225. See Miller, supra note 207, at *16 (suggesting possibility that
Quechan Tribe "will be seen as an outlier because of the strict requirements and
close scrutiny the court imposed on the BLM").
226. Wyoming, 2015 WL 5845145, *15 (considering the consultation
argument under standard for preliminary injunction requiring consideration of the
likelihood of success on the merits and without a full administrative record).
227. Id.
228. Id. at *17 (emphasis in original).
229. Id.
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"arbitrary and capricious action" on which the Ute Indian Tribe would
likely prevail.230
The district court's findings on tribal consultation were based
only upon the standards for a preliminary injunction, which were argued
by the parties with the benefit of an entire administrative record.23 1 in
addition, the federal and intervenor defendants have each appealed the
court's preliminary injunction and the federal appellants have argued that
their own consultation policies are not legally binding.232 Although the
viability of the district court's initial assessment of the BLM's adequacy
of tribal consultation in preparing the Final Rule is, at best, uncertain, it
underscores the legitimacy of the tribal concerns over the consultation
process expressed throughout the BLM's rulemaking.
At a minimum, the timing of the BLM's consultation outreach to
tribes supports reconsideration of the Final Rule as it applies to tribes. In
developing its approach to regulations regarding fracking, the Agency
first held one public forum and four public meetings in late 2010 and
2011, then drafted the initial rule and only then used the subsequent
tribal consultations to inform tribes of its efforts. 233 This was a far cry
from the drafting of the initial IMDA regulations, which were circulated
to tribes and tribal interest groups and revised based on their comments
prior to being available for any public comment.234 More recently, the
BIA, when revising its regulations related to surface leases of Indian
lands for residential, business, and renewable energy projects, distributed
a preliminary copy of draft regulations for tribal comment and
consultation, which the BIA considered and incorporated before
subsequently publishing the initial proposed rule. 235 Furthermore, unlike
the BLM's lack of willingness to significantly amend the Final Rule in
response to tribal comments, the final structure and format of both the
230.

Id. (citations omitted).

231. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, No. 2:15-CV-043-SWS, slip
op at *3 (D. Wyo. Dec. 17, 2015) (order den. mot. for final j. or stay of d. ct.
proceedings pending appeal). The issues are now fully briefed on the merits and, as
this article goes to publication, the matter is before Judge Skavdahl for
consideration.
232. Opening Br. for the Fed. Appellants, supra note 112, at 48-49;
Wyoming v. Dep't. of the Interior, No. 15-8126 (10th Cir. filed Nov. 27, 2015);
Wyoming v. Secretary Sally Jewell, No. 15-8134 (10th Cir. filed Dec. 15, 2015).
233. 80 Fed. Reg. at 16,132.
234. Mining Regulations, Proposed Rule, 48 Fed. Reg. 31,978 (June 15,
1983); see supra Section Ill.B.
235. Residential, Business, and Wind and Solar Resource Leases on
Indian Land, Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 73,784, 73,786 (Nov. 29, 2011); see infra
Section V.C.ii.
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IMLA and the IMDA regulations, along with numerous substantive
changes, were largely the result of changes made in response to tribal
input.2 36
Beyond its shortcomings in comparison to prior regulatory
drafting efforts, the BLM's tribal consultation also failed to align with
the Agency's mandates. Although Secretarial Order 3317 was issued
between the time of the public meetings and the initiation of tribal
consultations, the BLM was still bound by Executive Order 13,175 and
President Obama's 2009 Presidential Memorandum, both of which
encourage early and meaningful tribal consultation. By failing to engage
tribes in conjunction with its public outreach efforts in 2010 and 2011,
the BLM eliminated any opportunity for tribes to help shape the direction
of the Final Rule and, whether fairly or unfairly, created the perception
that the rule was responsive to general public concerns and that tribal
concerns were secondary. The subsequent failure of the BLM to separate
tribal issues from the broader public lands application of the Final Rule
further compounded this perception, rendering the Agency's follow-up
attempts to consult with tribes essentially meaningless. As a result, the
tribal consultation process that led to the Final Rule fell short of existing
consultation standards and is even less sufficient when viewed in
comparison to the efforts of the DOI to promulgate its current IMLA and
IMDA regulations over thirty years ago and the more recent efforts of the
BIA.

23 7

236.

See supra Section lI.B.
237. See id.; infra Section V.C.ii. The BLM's tribal consultation also
pales in comparison to the emerging international law concept of free, prior and
informed consent. See Miller, supra note 207, at *29-45. As it relates to tribal
consultation, the concept is most clearly embodied in Article 19 of the 2007 United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which requires that
"[s]tates shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free,
prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or
administrative measures that may affect them." United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, A/RES/61/259 art. XIX (Oct. 2, 2007), available at
http://www.un.org/esalsocdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS-en.pdf. In announcing that
the United States supports the UNDRIP, President Obama noted that "Washington
can't - and shouldn't - dictate a policy agenda for Indian Country. Tribal nations do
better when they make their own decisions." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ANNOUNCEMENT
OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF
INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES
2,
available
at

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/l84099.pdf
2016).
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Because the BLM's tribal consultation was flawed from the start
of the Final Rule's promulgation, the Agency would be well-served to
return to the table with tribes, engage in detailed consultation regarding
tribal concerns, which will vary from tribe to tribe, and reconsider the
substance of the Final Rule as applied to Indian lands in light of those
concerns.
B. Statutory Authority
In crafting the Final Rule as applied to Indian lands, the BLM
relied upon the general authority granted by the IMLA and the IMDA for
the Secretary to promulgate regulations implementing those laws.2 38
Supreme Court precedent allows federal agencies to exercise broad
discretion in the drafting of regulations, provided the Agency acts within
the bounds of its statutory authority.239 Even if the IMLA and the IMDA
grant the BLM broad discretion in crafting fracking regulations,
however, Congress specifically intended those acts to promote tribal
sovereignty and economic development, which are considerations
distinct from those relevant to the management of federal public lands.
By failing to recognize this distinction, the BLM's Final Rule fails to
serve the interests intended by Congress to be promoted by the IMLA
and the IMDA and is inconsistent with the purposes of the BLM's
statutory authority, if not the authority itself.
1. Purposes of the IMLA and the IMDA

Just as the trust responsibility is rooted in historic decisions of
the Supreme Court related to the federal relationship with Indian tribes,
the Court is largely responsible for creating and recognizing Congress'
plenary authority over Indian affairs.24 0 The Court has upheld a variety of
congressional actions related exclusively to Indian affairs, based on a
broad reading of the Constitution's Commerce Clause and a promotion
of the inherent authority of the federal government to address sovereign
matters, such as treaty making.2 4' Therefore, whether in exercise of the
238. E.g., 80 Fed. Reg. at 16,132.
239. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013) ("[n]o
matter how it is framed, the question a court faces when confronted with an agency's
interpretation of a statute it administers is always, simply, whether the agency has
stayed within the bounds of its statutory authority.").
240. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at §§ 501[4], 5.02[1], 38991.
241. Id. § 5.01[4], 390-91 n.53.
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federal trust responsibility or to terminate it,24 2 Congress has nearly
universal authority to create federal law in order to address concerns
specifically related to Indian Country. 243 The IMLA and the IMDA are
each examples of exercises of Congress's plenary authority over Indian
affairs in fulfillment of broader federal Indian policies.
The IMLA was enacted in 1938, just four years after the
adoption of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 ("IRA"). 24 4 The IRA
ended the disastrous allotment of tribal lands and, instead, sought to
change the course of federal Indian policy through the reinvigoration of
tribal self-government. In furtherance of that policy, the IRA authorized
tribes to adopt tribal constitutions and charter corporations. 2 45 The IRA
also restored unallotted and unsettled tribal lands to federal protection on
behalf of tribes. 2 46 Although not every tribe viewed the IRA as
supportive of traditional tribal government authority, the IRA reversed
the course of the federal government's prior assimilationist policies in
favor of broader support for tribal governments.24 7
As an extension of the IRA's policies, the IMLA promoted tribal
governmental authority by requiring tribal consent to mineral leases.248
Congress also intended the IMLA to promote tribal economic
development and, as a result, required the Secretary to utilize advertising
and bidding procedures that would help ensure a positive economic
return on IMLA leases. 24 9 Although the Supreme Court has determined
that the Secretary has no fiduciary responsibility to maximize tribal
revenues as a result of these directives, in doing so the Court noted that
imposing such a duty would be inconsistent (in the Court's view) with
the IMLA's intent to promote tribal self-determination.250
Congress' passage of the IMDA expanded the authority and
ability of tribes to negotiate various types of agreements to pursue energy

242.
1162,28 U.S.C.
243.
United States v.
244.

245.

See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as 18 U.S.C. §
§ 1360,25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (2012)).
See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-68 (1903);
Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 412-16 (1980).
25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2012).

Id. §§ 476, 477.

246. Id. § 463(a).
247. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at § 1.05, 82-83.
248. 25 U.S.C. § 396a.
249. 25 U.S.C. § 396b (requiring advertisement of leases and
consideration of the 'highest qualified bidder", subject to consideration by the
Secretary of whether awarding a lease to such bidder would be in Indian's best
interests or consent by the Indians to a privately negotiated lease).
250. United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 508 (2003).

48

PUBLIC LAND& RESOURCES LAWREVIEW

Vol. 37

development.2 5' These agreements, including joint ventures, operating,
production sharing, service or other agreements, sought to enhance tribal
participation and involvement in mineral development beyond simply
acting as a passive lessor under the IMLA.252 This flexibility was
intended 'first, to further the policy of self-determination and second, to
maximize the
financial return tribes can expect for their valuable mineral
25 3
resources."'
Similarly, the IMDA required that the Secretary consider the best
interests of a tribe when reviewing a proposed IMDA agreement,
including economic, environmental, and other factors.254 Consideration
of these tribal interests may also help the Secretary fulfill her statutory
duty to advise a tribe about the viability of a potential IMDA agreement
during negotiation of that agreement by the tribe.255 While the IMDA's
statutory mandates and corresponding regulatory requirements may
appear to create legally enforceable responsibilities for the Secretary, the
IMDA also specifically waives the liability of the United States for
"losses sustained by a tribe or individual Indian" under an IMDA
agreement approved by the Secretary. 256 By excusing the United States
from liability for an IMDA deal that results in losses to a tribe, the
waiver recognizes the greater potential for risk posed by the variety of
agreements authorized by the IMDA and the tribal role in negotiating
those agreements.257 In both the IMLA and the IMDA, therefore,
Congress considered the challenges facing Indian Country, specifically
the need to promote and support tribal authority and economic
development, and passed legislation expressly aimed at those purposes.
2. Purposes of FLPMA
While the BLM cited the IMLA and the IMDA as authority
supporting the promulgation of the Final Rule and its application to
Indian lands, the Agency also proposed amending its existing regulations
to incorporate FLPMA as separate authority supporting the Agency's
251.

25 U.S.C. § 2102.

252.

Id.

253. Quantum Exploration, Inc. v. Clark, 780 F.2d 1457, 1458 (9th Cir.
1986) (quoting S. REP. No. 97-472, at 2 (1982)).
254. 25 U.S.C. § 2103(b).
255. Id. § 2106; see also Quantum Exploration, 780 F.2d at 1460-61.
256. 25 U.S.C. § 2103(e).
257. See Royster, supra note 73, at 591 ("[t]he intent of the holdharmless provision is that if tribes wish to become partners in development, then
tribes must take the risk of loss.")
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application of the rule to federal lands.258 Like the IMLA and the IMDA,
FLPMA demonstrates congressional intent to establish specific standards
for management of natural resources by the Secretary. Unlike the
Secretary's duties to fulfill Congress' intent to promote tribal selfdetermination and economic development, however, FLPMA provides
that the Secretary must manage the "public lands under principles of
multiple use and sustained yield."259 Congress further required that the
Secretary shall, "[i]n managing the public lands . . . by regulation or
otherwise, take any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue
degradation of the lands."260 Congress' policy in doing so was to ensure
that the public lands would be managed to "protect the quality of
scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and
atmospheric, water resource, and archaeological values" but also to
recognize the "[n]ation's need for domestic sources of minerals." 26 ' The
Supreme Court has recognized that FLPMA's use of the "deceptively
simple term," "multiple use management" therefore results in "the
enormously complicated task of striking a balance among the many
competing uses to which land can be put."2 62 Although the nature of this
balance can swing from development-oriented to more conservationminded depending upon the political winds that blow, the interests that
Congress demanded the Secretary to serve under FLPMA are those of
the public, not Indian tribes. The balance to be weighed in managing the
public lands, therefore, largely excludes tribal interests of the type
specifically promoted by the IMLA and the IMDA in the management of
Indian lands.26 3
The treatment of tribal interests in the management of federal
lands demonstrates the distinction between public and tribal interests.
Often, conflict arises over the "multiple use" of such lands by the public
and the desire of many tribes to maintain cultural and spiritual
258.

80 Fed. Reg. at 16,141, 16,217.

259.
260.

43 U.S.C. § 1732(a).
Id. § 1732(b).

261.

Id. § 1701(8), (12).

262. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 58 (2004).
263. In summarizing the statutory authority supporting the Final Rule,
BLM Director Neil Kornze told a House Subcommittee that "[o]n net, this statutory
regime requires the BLM to balance responsible development with protection of the
environment and public safety." Bureau of Land Management's Final Hydraulic
FracturingRule, supra note 104 (statement of Neil Kornze, Dir., Bureau of Land
Mgmt.,
at
2-3),
available
at
http://naturalresources.house.gov/uploadedfiles/kornzetestimony.pdf.
Although he
mentioned the IMLA, Kornze did not suggest that the Agency also needed to
consider tribal self-determination or economic development.
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connections to their ancestral homelands and the sacred sites thereon, of
which many tribes have been dispossessed.2 64 Professor Rebecca Tsosie
has forcefully argued for a broader interpretation of the Indian trust
doctrine in this context, noting that although "Native peoples' rights are
often not differentiated in any meaningful way from the interests of other
'stakeholders' in the process of federal agency decision-making, those
rights "must be differentiated from their rights as separate nations that
have a trust relationship with the United States government." 265 On this
basis, Professor Tsosie maintains that where conflicts arise over the use
of federal lands outside of Indian Country, "future solutions must
respond to the cultural distinctiveness of Native nations, as well as their
unique political status within the domestic federal system."26 6 While
these considerations are largely ignored in the management of public
lands, the congressional purposes behind the IMLA and the IMDA
promote a different and more Indian trust oriented regulatory approach to
Indian lands than FLPMA did for federal lands. Nonetheless, in
promulgating the Final Rule, the BLM conflated its public land
management responsibilities under FLPMA with its regulatory authority
under the IMLA and IMDA.
The BLM did not distinguish between Indian and federal public
lands under the Final Rule or in its proposed application. In justifying
this decision, the BLM noted that its existing regulations applied to both
types of land and that it viewed its obligations to tribes as requiring that
their lands be protected to the same degree as public lands.267 While
acknowledging that the BLM could allow for separate regulations and
264.

Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Prot. Ass'n., 485 U.S. 439, 451

(1988) (citation omitted) (denying First Amendment claims of tribal members and
associations asserted against the building of a road through an area of historical
occupation and spiritual significance, the effect of which would "'virtually destroy
the . . . Indians' ability to practice their religion"'); Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 535 F. 3d 1058, 1063 (10th Cir. 2008) (denying that the spraying of treated
sewage water on the San Francisco Peaks of Arizona, considered sacred by many
local tribes and their members, would amount to a substantial burden on the exercise
of their religion because such use of water would only affect their "subjective
spiritual experience.")

265. Rebecca Tsosie, The Conflict between the 'Public Trust' and the
'Indian Trust' Doctrines: FederalPublic Land Policy and Native Nations, 39 TULSA
L. REV. 271, 300 (2003).
266. Id. at 310.
267. See, e.g., 80 Fed. Reg. at 16,129 ("[I]ike other BLM regulations, this

final rule applies to oil and gas operations on public lands . .

,as well as operations

on Indian lands, to ensure that these lands and communities all receive the same
level of protection as provided on public lands.").
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regulatory oversight of tribal lands, the BLM felt its uniform approach
was "more economic" than creating a parallel regulatory scheme within
the BIA. 2 68 In addition, the BLM acknowledged that both state and tribal
regulations may apply in conjunction with the Final Rule and allowed a
process for considering specific variances to the Final Rule for both so
long as those regulations were as stringent as the Final Rule's
requirements.269 While claiming to respect the federal policy of tribal
self-determination, the BLM viewed tribal governmental authority on the
same basis as state governments and largely ignored the uniquely tribal
interests promoted by the IMLA and the IMDA.
Similarly, although the Agency evaluated the economic impacts
of the Final Rule on tribes and concluded that the rule "poses an
incremental cost of about $10 million per year" across Indian Country,
the BLM did not analyze whether or how that additional incremental cost
may impact tribal economic development as intended under the IMLA
and the IMDA.270 Instead, the BLM suggested that increased regulatory
costs were just part of doing business on federal and Indian lands.27 ' In
addition, the BLM focused only on the potential effects of the Final Rule
itself, stating that "[t]he rule would not render Indian lands more or less
attractive than Federal lands."272 This narrow focus ignored the
significant difference between the need for tribes to develop their
homelands and economies and the much less critical economic pressures
applicable to management of the public lands.273 The myopic treatment
of Indian and federal lands further overlooked applicability of the Final
Rule in the context of express congressional intent to promote tribal
economic development and failed to acknowledge the existing regulatory

268.
269.
270.

Id. at 16,185.
Id. at 16,221 (proposed 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(k)).
Id. at 16,206-07. Industry groups have claimed the agency vastly

underestimated the actual costs of the Final Rule; however, because the Rule is yet
to be implemented, the exact costs of compliance are yet to be determined. See
Michelle Ye Hee Lee, You Can't Trust the Numbers on the New Fracking Regs,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
30,
2015),
available
at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/03/30/you-cant-trustthe-numbers-on-the-new-fracking-regs/.
271. 80 Fed. Reg. at 16,212.
272. Id. at 16,185.
273. See, e.g., Bruce R. Huber, The Fair Market Value of Public
Resources, 103 CAL. L. REV. 1515 (2015) (outlining the challenges and failures of
the federal government to obtain fair market value for public resources in various
contexts).
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environment applicable to Indian lands, which, as the GAO recently
reported, already creates significant barriers to development. 274
Therefore, although the BLM enjoyed broad discretion in
promulgating the Final Rule, in exercise of that discretion, it overlooked
or discounted specific Congressional interests supporting tribal
sovereignty and economic development in favor of a uniform regulatory
scheme applicable to both Indian and federal lands. In doing so, the
Agency ignored "considerations governing the administration of Indianowned resources [that] are different from those involved in administering
the public estate"-the very same considerations that Secretary of the
Interior Thomas S. Kleppe relied on nearly forty years ago to call for
revisions to the DOI's coal mining regulations.275 New rulemaking that,
while incorporating a meaningful tribal consultation process, is also more
sensitive to these specific and substantive tribal considerations would be
more faithful to congressional intent.
C. Trust Responsibility
Just as the Final Rule is inconsistent with the statutory purposes
supporting the IMLA and the IMDA, it is also out of step with recent
congressional actions related to energy development and rulemakings of
other agencies regarding the management of tribal natural resources. In
each of these areas, Congress and the BIA have sought to carry out their
trust responsibility through the promotion of tribal authority rather than
the expansion of federal oversight.
1. CongressionalAction Regarding Indian Energy Development
Although the self-determination era is now nearly fifty years on
from President Nixon's message, the federal government continues to
refine its approach to supporting and encouraging tribal selfdetermination. Through this evolution, the federal trust responsibility can
be seen less as a duty to oversee and protect tribes and instead as an
obligation to foster and encourage tribal sovereignty. This approach has
been especially apparent with regard to recent enactments authorizing
greater tribal management of energy and surface resources.
The ITEDSDA, passed in 2005, authorizes a tribe to negotiate
and enter into a TERA with the Secretary that would allow the tribe to
274.

GAO-15-502, supra note 98.

275.

Mining on Indian Lands: Mineral Development Contracts, Proposed

Rules, 42 Fed. Reg. 18,083 (Mar. 30, 1977).
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approve energy related leases, rights-of-way and other agreements for
projects on Indian lands without secretarial approval. To do so, a tribe
must demonstrate sufficient capacity for the oversight of such
agreements and develop an approval process that includes an opportunity
for and responds to public input.276 In addition, the ITEDSDA waives
any liability of the federal government resulting from any negotiated
term of any agreement approved by a tribe pursuant to a TERA. 277 This
waiver of liability, which is similar to but narrower than the waiver of
federal liability under the IMDA, recognizes that the federal government
is not responsible for the consummation of any agreement entered into
by a tribe under its own authority pursuant to a TERA. While some have
argued that the waiver of liability and elimination of federal oversight of
energy-related agreements amounts to a reduction of the federal trust
responsibility,27 8 the ITEDSDA's broader policy of enhancing tribal
governance and regulatory structures, albeit subject to certain conditions,
demonstrates a shift away from the conception of the trust responsibility
as mandating only federal oversight and protection of tribal resources.
This shift was further emphasized in the passage of the
HEARTH Act in 2012. Like the ITEDSDA, the HEARTH Act empowers
tribes to review and approve surface leases on their own lands without
federal review and approval of each individual lease, provided the tribal
process for doing so meets certain standards.279 In general, the tribe's
leasing regulations must be consistent with federal leasing regulations
and, just like under a TERA, the tribe must provide an environmental
review process similar to the NEPA process. The federal government is
also excused from any liability associated with a tribally-approved
lease.280 In addition, the HEARTH Act provides an opportunity to
petition the Secretary for review of a tribe's compliance with its
regulations, provided tribal remedies have been exhausted.

276.

25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(c). For an analysis of ITEDSDA's place

along the evolution of tribal control over mineral development and discussion of its
downsides, see Judith Royster, PracticalSovereignty, PoliticalSovereignty, and the
Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-DeterminationAct, 12 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 1065 (2008).
277. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(6)(D)(ii).
278. Elizabeth Ann Kronk, Tribal Energy Resource Agreements: The
Unintended 'Great Mischieffor Indian Energy Development'andthe Resulting Need
for Reform, 29 PACE ENvT'L. L. REV. 811, 845-48 (2012).

279.
280.

25 U.S.C. § 415(h).
Id.

281.

Id.
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As with the ITEDSDA, these requirements have generated
criticism of the diminished federal role in protecting tribal resources;2 82
however, the DOI offered tribes significant assistance in taking
advantage of the HEARTH Act. For example, the BIA prepared a
checklist,28 3 provided a national policy memorandum setting forth
detailed guidance,
and created a largely transparent review and
approval process for proposed tribal regulations. 28 5 As a result, unlike the
ITEDSDA, pursuant to which no tribe has yet entered a TERA, over
twenty tribes are now reviewing and approving surface leases for their
own lands without federal involvement under the HEARTH Act. 286
Although neither would displace the BLM's Final Rule, 287 both
the ITEDSDA and the HEARTH Act demonstrate the ongoing evolution
of federal efforts to refocus the trust responsibility away from federal
oversight and toward the promotion of tribal authority. These two
examples are particularly relevant in comparison to the BLM's Final
Rule because they demonstrate specific support for increased tribal
regulatory authority over development on Indian lands. Unlike the
ITEDSDA and the HEARTH Act, the Final Rule increases the federal
role in review and approval of development activities on Indian lands
without any opportunity to promote the tribal regulatory role. Although
the BLM sought to emphasize that the Final Rule would not interfere or
preempt tribal regulations and that the Rule's variance process allowed
the Agency to consider whether tribal regulations could apply in limited
instances, the Final Rule itself does not allow for the assumption of any
282. Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Tribal Renewable Energy
Development under the HEARTH Act: an Independently Rational but Collectively
Deficient Option, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 1031 (2013) (criticizing the HEARTH Act's
waiver of federal liability and mandated environmental review process as erosive of
both tribal sovereignty and the federal trust responsibility).
283. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, INDIAN AFFS., SAMPLE CHECKLIST FOR
REGULATIONS
SUBMITTED
UNDER
THE
HEARTH
ACT,
available at
http://www.indianaffairs.gov/cs/groups/xots/documents/document/idc1-032154.pdf
(last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
284. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFS., NATIONAL
POLICY MEMORANDUM: GUIDANCE FOR THE APPROVAL OF TRIBAL LEASING
REGULATIONS UNDER THE HEARTH ACT, NPM-TRUS-29 (Jan. 16, 2013) available

at http://www.indianaffairs.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/
idcl-026788.pdf.
285. Bureau of Indian Aff., HEARTH Act of 2012, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, http://www.indianaffairs.gov/WhoWeAre/BIA/OTS/HEARTH
/index.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
286. Id.
287. See supra notes 190, 191.
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additional regulatory authority by tribes. 288 In fact, by adopting a rule
that provides comprehensive federal standards and requirements that
apply in addition to any existing or yet to be adopted tribal standards, the
Final Rule dis-incentivizes tribal regulation of fracking, particularly in
light of the delays caused by the existing federal role in tribal energy
development. 289 Therefore, rather than promote tribal authority over
tribal lands as Congress has done in the ITEDSDA and the HEARTH
Act, the Final Rule discourages tribes from regulating fracking on their
own.
2. Agency Rulemaking
Congress is not alone in its commitment to expanded federal
deference to tribal decision-making. Recent updates by the BIA of its
leasing and right-of-way regulations, which were proceeding
contemporaneously with the BLM's development of the Final Rule,
demonstrate increased agency recognition for and respect of tribal
authority as well.
In February 2011, the BIA released to tribes for review and
comment a preliminary draft revision to the BIA's regulations regarding
tribal surface leases, found at 25 C.F.R. part 162.290 After consulting with
tribes on the draft revisions at various tribal meetings and requesting and
reviewing written comments on the preliminary draft, the BIA published
a proposed rule in November 2011.291 The proposed rule acknowledged
that secretarial approval of surface leases remained a statutory
requirement (the rule was proposed prior to passage of the HEARTH
Act) but sought to streamline and make the approval process more
efficient.29 2 To do so, the BIA proposed eliminating the need to approve
permits, certain subleases, and assignments; requiring a timeline for its
approval; and limiting the bases on which it could refuse to approve
amendments, assignments, and other lease-related agreements.29 3
Importantly, the proposed rule also eliminated the requirement that the
BIA ensure that the tribal lessee secure fair market value for the lease
288. 80 Fed Reg. at 16,185 ("[a] variance [if granted in BLM's sole and
un-appealable discretion] would not necessarily adopt tribal regulations as the
Federal rule.")
289. GAO-15-502, supra note 98.

290.
291.

76 Fed. Reg. at 73,786.
Id.

292. Id. at 73,784-85 (describing various changes to make regulations
more efficient and transparent).

293.

Id. at 73,785.
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and replaced it with a provision deferring to the tribal lessee's
negotiation of the value of the lease unless the tribe requests a fair
market valuation.294 The proposed rule also required the BIA to comply
with tribal law 29 5 and allowed the Secretary to waive any provisions of
the draft regulations that conflicted with tribal law, subject to certain
limitations.2 96
In general, tribal reaction to the proposed rule was positive, as
the BIA noted in publishing a revised rule as the final leasing rule in
December 2012.297 Even so, in response to a tribal comment urging
greater deference to tribes in financial matters, the BIA "reviewed the
regulation to ensure that the final rule requires BIA to defer to tribes in
all possible cases, consistent with our trust responsibility."298 Therefore,
the final leasing rule maintained the BIA's deference to tribal law and the
preamble to the rule explained that the "BIA will defer to tribal law in
decisions regarding leases beyond just the approval decision." 29 9
Similarly, the final leasing rule incorporated a new section
specifically addressing the taxability of improvements, activities, and
leasehold interests on leased Indian land.300 This new section built upon
language of the proposed rule and emphasized the federal and tribal
interests in leasing Indian lands which, according to established Supreme
Court precedent, should tip the balance away from state taxation of nonIndian interests in leased Indian lands. 3 0 1 In doing so, the preamble to the
294. Id. at 73,798 (proposed section 162.320).
295. Id. at 73,794 (proposed section 162.014).
296. Id. (proposed section 162.013) (the Secretary would be prohibited
from waiving a regulatory provision in favor of tribal law if such waiver would
violate a federal statute or judicial decision or "conflict with the United States' trust
responsibility under Federal law.")
297. Residential, Business, and Wind and Solar Resource Leases on
Indian Land, Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 72,439, 72,442 (Dec. 5, 2012) ("[t]ribes stated
that they supported the steps BIA took in the proposed rule to recognize tribal
sovereignty and tribes' achievements in terms of their ability to manage their own
affairs on critical leasing issues. Tribes were particularly supportive of provisions for
tribal waiver of appraisals, deadlines for BIA action, and BIA's deference to the
Indian landowners' determination that the lease is in their best interest.")
298. Id. (emphasis added).
299. Id. at 72,446. Like the proposed version of the leasing rule, the final
leasing rule allowed for tribal law to supersede or modify the regulations where the
tribe notified the BIA of the superseding or modifying effect, it would not violate
otherwise applicable federal law, and the superseding or modification of the
regulation would apply only on tribal land. Id. § 162.014, 72,472.
300. Id. § 162.017, 72,447.
301. Id. (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448, U.S. 136,
143 (1980) (courts must conduct a particularized inquiry of state, federal and tribal
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final leasing rule expressly stated the purposes for the rule as
"promot[ing] Indian housing and .. . allow[ing] Indian landowners to use
their land profitably for economic development, ultimately contributing
to tribal well-being and self-government."302 Increases in project costs,
such as the imposition of state and local taxes, would frustrate this latter
purpose and the BIA specifically noted the unique impact of such
increased costs on tribes, who face significant challenges in attracting
capital investment in the first place.303 The BIA viewed the rule as
further promoting tribal sovereignty and self-government through the
regulations by ensuring that the final leasing rule required "significant
deference, to the maximum extent possible, to tribal determinations that a
3 04
lease provision or requirement is in [the tribe's] best interest."
The BIA's approach to its trust responsibility in the final leasing
regulations stands in marked contrast to how the BLM considered its
responsibilities to tribes in its revised proposed rule, even though both
agencies were developing their rules during the same timeframe.305
Where the BIA's final leasing rule viewed deference to tribes "in all
possible cases" as consistent with its trust responsibility, the BLM's
revised proposed rule contemplated the trust responsibility as
interchangeable with the Secretary's responsibility to prevent undue or
unnecessary degradation of public lands.306 Where the BIA's final
leasing rule allowed a tribe to notify the Secretary that its own tribal
rules will supersede or modify the federal regulations, provided such
tribal rules would not violate otherwise applicable federal law, the
BLM's revised proposed rule only allowed tribes to request limited
interests to determine the authority of a state to tax non-Indian activity on a
reservation)).
302. Id. (emphasis added).
303. Id. at 72,448 ("[i]ncreased project costs can impede a tribe's ability
to attract non-Indian investment to Indian lands where such investment and
participation are critical to the vitality of tribal economies. An increase in project
costs is especially damaging to economic development on Indian lands given the
difficulty Indian tribes and individuals face in securing access to capital.")

304.

Id.

305. The BIA's final leasing rule became effective on January 4, 2013,
less than five months before the BLM issued the revised version of its initial
proposed fracking rule. Compare 77 Fed. Reg. at 72,440, with 78 Fed. Reg. at
31,636. Thus, presumably the BLM was drafting the revised proposed rule as the
BIA finalized its leasing regulations.
306. Compare 77 Fed. Reg. at 72,442 (BIA final leasing rule), with 78
Fed. Reg. at 31,644 (BLM's proposed revised rule, stating that the "revised
regulation prevents undue or unnecessary degradation of public lands and furthers
the Secretary's trust responsibilities on Indian lands.")
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variances from its provisions and required that any such variance be
approved by the BLM, subject only to the Agency's own discretion.3 07
Similarly, while the BIA's final leasing rule sought to enhance the ability
of tribes to use their lands "profitably for economic development" in
light of the "especially damaging" impact of increased project costs on
tribes, 308 the BLM acknowledged that its revised proposed rule would
increase the administrative delays and costs for those seeking to develop
tribal lands, making those lands potentially less attractive than state or
private lands not subject to such additional administrative burdens. 30 9
Ignoring the BIA's sensitivity to the challenges of tribal economic
development, the BLM instead viewed the increased costs created by the
revised proposed rule as an ordinary cost of doing business. 310
Less than two years after finalizing its revised leasing rules and
nearly a year prior to publication of the BLM's Final Rule, the BIA also
embarked on an effort to revise its outdated regulations governing the
process for its review and approval of rights-of-way across Indian
lands.311 In doing so, the BIA noted that the revision of the right-of-way
regulations was prompted by the supportive responses it received to the
final leasing rule and that it sought to revise the right-of-way regulations
in a similar manner.312 As a result, the proposed right-of-way rule
included similar provisions deferring to tribal decision-making regarding
compensation, 3 13 promoting the applicability of tribal laws and
authority, 314 and recognizing the exclusion of state tax authority over
permanent improvements,31 activities,31 or interests in a right-of-way. 31 1
Each of these provisions were carried over into the final right-of-way
307.

Compare 77 Fed. Reg. at § 162.014, 72,472, with 78 Fed. Reg. at

31,677 (proposed section 3162.3-3(k)).
308. 77 Fed. Reg. at 72,447-48.
309. 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,670 ("[t]he BLM is aware that the revised
proposed rule would nonetheless result in some higher costs for operators on Federal
and Indian lands, compared with compliance costs for hydraulic fracturing on nonFederal, non-Indian lands in several States.").
310. Id. ("[r]egulatory compliance costs, however, are only one set in a
long list of costs that operators compare to anticipated revenues when deciding
whether and how much to bid on a Federal or Indian lease.")
311. Rights-of-Way on Indian Land, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,455 (June 11,
2014).
312. Id.
313. Id. § 169.109(a), 34.467.
314. Id. § 169.008, 34,464.
315. Id. § 169.009(a), 34,464.

316.
317.

Id. § 169.009(b), 34,464.
Id. § 169.009(c), 34,464.
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1
rule."'
The first section of the revised regulations will now make explicit
the BIA's intent "to support tribal self-determination and self-governance
by acknowledging and incorporating tribal law and policies in processing
a request for a right-of-way across tribal lands and defer to the maximum
extent possible to Indian landowner decisions regarding their Indian
land." 3 19 Such support for tribal sovereignty is quite different from the
BLM's determination that the trust responsibility prevented any
deference to tribal decisions regarding their own fracking regulations.32 0
According to the BLM, the Final Rule's limited recognition of tribal
regulations through the possibility of a variance, which "would not
necessarily adopt tribal regulations as the federal rule," ensures that the
Final Rule "accords with tribal self-determination to the extent that could
be expected from a rule governing hydraulic fracturing operations." 32 1
The BLM's view of its trust responsibility and the interplay of
that responsibility with tribal sovereignty and self-determination is
inconsistent with how Congress encouraged tribal authority through the
ITEDSDA and the HEARTH Act and particularly incongruent with the
BIA's approach to regulatory oversight of leasing and rights-of-ways on
Indian land. In each of the statutory and regulatory examples discussed
herein, either Congress or the BIA developed an approach to the federal
government's role in administering its responsibilities to tribes and
Indian lands that specifically accounted for and promoted tribal
sovereign interests, including both governmental and economic
development concerns. Each of these efforts either pre-dated or was
contemporaneous with the BLM's promulgation of its Final Rule;
however, rather than fashion its Final Rule in a similar manner, the BLM
elevated uniformity of regulation across both federal and Indian lands to
its highest priority. This approach does not correspond with the current

318. Rights-of-Way on Indian Land, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,492 (Nov. 19,
2015). After initially scheduling the new regulations to take effect in December
2015, the BlA twice postponed their effective date. See, e.g., Rights-of-Way on
Indian Land, 80 Fed. Reg. 79,258 (Dec. 21, 2015) (extending effective date of the
final right-of-way rule from December 21, 2015, to March 21, 2016); Rights-of-Way
on Indian Land, 81 Fed. Reg. 14,976 (Mar. 21, 2016) (extending effective date until
April 21, 2016 and the compliance date "for submission of documentation of past
assignments" until August 16, 2016).
319. 80 Fed. Reg. at 72,535.
320. 80 Fed. Reg. at 16,185 (the Secretary would fail to fulfill her trust
responsibility "if the BLM failed to implement the final rule because a tribe was
implementing its own program.")

321.

Id.
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migration of federal policy and rulemaking away from federal
paternalism and toward greater tribal self-determination.322
VI. CONCLUSION
The BLM's efforts to regulate fracking on both federal and
Indian lands resulted in a nearly five year process that produced the Final
Rule, only to have the Rule preliminarily enjoined by the Wyoming
District Court, which was concerned about the Agency's statutory
authority to regulate fracking, the need for the rule, and the BLM's tribal
consultation process. 32 3 While that litigation portends a judicial
resolution of the debate over regulatory authority between the federal
government and states as a matter of federalism, the BLM's view of its
trust responsibility to Indian tribes and its lack of meaningful deference
to tribal sovereignty and self-determination are not likely to garner
significant judicial scrutiny. 324 Provided the BLM prevails in its
argument that the IMLA and the IMDA are a statutory basis for the Final
325
Rule, courts are lkl
likely to defer to the agency's discretion in crafting
322.

While not as directly comparable as the BIA's leasing and right-of-

way regulations, recent efforts by other federal agencies have also demonstrated
increasing sensitivity to and respect for tribal sovereignty and related issues. See,
e.g., Revised Interpretation of Clean Water Act Tribal Provisions, 80 Fed. Reg.
47,430 (Aug. 7, 2015) (EPA proposes reinterpretation of Clean Water Act Tribal
Provision that would enhance EPA's ability to authorize tribes to administer federal
regulatory programs on their reservations); Gathering of Certain Plants or Plant Parts
by Federally Recognized Indian Tribes for Traditional Purposes, 80 Fed. Reg.
21,674 (Apr. 20, 2015) (National Park Service proposes regulations authorizing
intergovernmental agreements between the federal and tribal governments to
authorize tribal members to gather and remove plants used for traditional purposes
from National Parks).
323. Wyoming, 2015 WL 5845145.
324. Although the Ute Indian Tribe argued that the Final Rule amounted
to a breach of the BLM's trust obligations to tribes, the District Court did not
consider that argument in granting the preliminary injunction. Id.; Wyoming v. U.S.
Dep't of the Interior, No. 2:15-CV-043-SWS, slip op. at 4-9 (D. Wyo. June 22,
2015) (mem. in support of TRO and prelim. inj.).
325. Judge Skavdahl took a dim view of the BLM's statutory authority
for the Final Rule in preliminarily enjoining application of the Rule, although his
order offered scant analysis of the IMLA and IMDA and, instead, focused primarily
on whether any of the statutes on which the BLM relied granted the agency authority
to regulate beyond surface impacts. Wyoming, 2015 WL 5845145, at *6 (noting that
BLM failed to "cite any specific provision of the mineral leasing statutes authorizing
regulation of this underground activity or regulation for the purpose of guarding
against any incidental, undergroundenvironmental effects") (emphasis added); Id. at
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the Final Rule within the bounds of that authority.3 26 Furthermore, the
grounds on which a tribe could successfully claim that the federal trust
responsibility creates a legally enforceable duty to craft regulations in a
particular manner are quite narrow, particularly in light of the Supreme
Court's dim view of the Secretary's responsibilities to tribes under the
IMLA.3 27
While neither the district court nor any appellate court may have
the authority to force the BLM to reconsider the trust responsibility and
re-craft the Final Rule to better accommodate tribal sovereign interests,
this article demonstrates the need for the Agency to amend the Final Rule
to exclude Indian lands from its application, return to the drafting table,
re-initiate tribal consultation, and more carefully consider the appropriate
exercise of its delegated regulatory authority over Indian lands. Such an
*9-10 (also basing preliminary injunction on congressional decision to remove
fracking from purview of SDWA, "[i]n determining whether Congress has spoken
directly to the BLM's authority to regulate hydraulic fracturing under the (Mineral
Leasing Act] or FLPMA, this Court cannot ignore the implication of Congress'
fracking-specific legislation in the SDWA and [the 2005 Energy Policy Act].")
326. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1868 (relying on Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (the leading case
on judicial deference to agency action, in which the Supreme Court stated "[w]hen a
challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized,
really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a
reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail.")).
327. See Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 508 (denying money damages based
on Navajo Nation's claim that the Secretary breached a fiduciary duty created by the
IMLA). Although the Navajo Nation claims were money damages claims, courts
have failed to properly distinguish such claims from those seeking injunctive relief
and have required that tribes demonstrate that Congress intended to create fiduciary
duties through express statutory language, regardless of whether the tribe is seeking
damages. See, e.g., El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. United States, 750 F.3d 863, 892
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (a tribe's challenge to agency action "failed to state a claim for
relieve because the Tribe [did] not identify] a substantive source of law establishing
specific fiduciary duties, a failure which is fatal to its trust claim regardless of
whether we read the claim as brought under the [Administrative Procedures Act] or
under a cause of action implied by the nature of the fiduciary relationship itself.")
(emphasis in original); COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at § 5.05[3][c], 430-432.
Professor Mary Christina Wood artfully critiqued the improper conflation of these
claims and called for the clarification of "the confused direction of the trust
doctrine." Mary Christina Wood, The Indian Trust Responsibility: Protecting Tribal
Lands and Resources Through Claims ofInjunctive ReliefAgainst FederalAgencies,
29 TULSA L. REV. 355, 367, 365-68 (2003). Notwithstanding the strength and
accuracy of this argument; however, a tribe would likely face significant difficulty in
convincing a federal judge that the trust responsibility limits the broad authority to
promulgate regulations granted to the Secretary by the IMLA and the IMDA.
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approach would be more consistent with the BLM's responsibilities to
ensure timely and meaningful tribal consultation, could allow for a Final
Rule that is more respectful of tribal sovereignty and economic
development, and would allow the Agency to bring its conception of the
trust responsibility more in line with the current direction of promoting
tribal authority and decision-making. Withdrawing Indian lands from the
Final Rule's coverage would also provide the added benefit of limiting
the bases on which the Final Rule could be challenged and would allow
the BLM to focus on the statutory authority arguments raised by states
challenging the Final Rule, without also having to defend its lackluster
tribal consultation efforts. Lastly, there is precedent supporting
reconsideration of the Final Rule in light of legitimate concerns raised
even after its publication as a final rule.328
The issues faced by the BLM both during and after the
rulemaking process offer helpful lessons for federal agencies attempting
to create rules that transcend the boundary between federal and Indian
lands. First, any agency considering an issue that may impact tribes or
tribal citizens would be well-served by engaging in substantive and
meaningful tribal consultation early and often. The BLM's failure to
engage tribes in the same way that it reached out to the broader public set
the wrong tone for the entire development of the Final Rule and
ultimately provided one ground for preliminarily enjoining the Final
Rule.329 Second, agencies would be wise to carefully consider the
statutory foundations for their proposed actions and work to ensure that
their regulations align with the intent behind those laws. By focusing on
the need to protect Indian lands in the same manner as federal lands, the
BLM crafted a Final Rule that minimized the promotion of tribal
sovereignty and economic development, which were the express
purposes of the IMLA and the IMDA on which the agency based its
authority to apply the Final Rule to Indian lands. Finally, considering a
proposed rulemaking within the broader context of the self-determination
era and the evolving trust relationship would result in a regulatory
approach that more closely aligns with tribal interests and the efforts of
other agencies. BIA's recent rulemakings demonstrate how an agency
can exercise its discretion to craft appropriate regulations that fulfill the
federal government's trust responsibility by deferring to tribal decision328.

The regulations implementing the IMLA and IMDA were initially

published as final rules only to be withdrawn in response to concerns over their lack
of clarity and the confusion caused by their treatment of tribal mineral development.
61 Fed. Reg. 35,634 at 35,635.
329. Wyoming, 2015 WL 5845145.
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making and promoting tribal sovereignty. Rather than follow the BIA's
lead, however, the BLM developed the Final Rule with a commitment to
an outdated and paternalistic view of the federal trust responsibility.
Tribes expect more from their federal partners and the BLM
should honor those expectations and work with Indian tribes within
Indian Country to develop a new approach to regulating fracking that
respects the boundary between federal and Indian lands.

